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LEGAL REVOLUTIONS: SIX MISTAKES
ABOUT DISCONTINUITY IN THE LEGAL
ORDER
MICHAEL STEVEN GREEN•

A legal revolution occurs when chains of legal dependence rupture
-causing one legal system to be replaced by a different and
incommensurable legal system. For example, before the French
Revolution chains of legal dependence ultimately led to Louis XVI,
but after this legal revolution they led to the National Assembly (or
the people of France it represented).
The very possibility of legal revolutions depends upon laws being
structured into legal systems in this fashion. And yet, despite
substantial academic interest in legal revolutions, there has been a
reluctance to examine the structure that makes them possible. The
goal of this Article is to begin to fill this gap by examining six
mistakes in reasoning about legal revolutions that occur when the
structure of legal systems is ignored. My discussion focuses on
concrete examples of these mistakes, drawn from a wide variety of
sources, including the writings of Akhil Amar, the Supreme Court
of Pakistan's 1958 decision in State v. Dosso, the jurisprudence of
John Austin, and recent criticisms ofBush v. Gore.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1788, a financial crisis forced Louis XVI to summon the
Estates-General, a representative body with no tradition of vested
powers. 1 On June 17, 1789, the Third Estate, which consisted of
commoners, withdrew from the Estates-General and renamed itself
the National Assembly. 2 Three days later, in the Tennis Court Oath,
it announced its intention to promulgate a constitution for France.3
Popular support for the Assembly increased, and on June 27 the King
recognized it. 4
Was this a legal revolution-a break in the continuity of the legal

1. 1 GEORGES LEFEBVRE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: FROM ITS ORIGINS TO
1793, at 97-102 (Elizabeth Moss Evanson trans., 1962).
2. /d. at 112.
3. See id. at 112-13.
4. /d. at 114.
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order? Was one legal system replaced by another through extra-legal
means? Before June, 1789, Louis XVI's authority was absolute: all
valid laws could be traced back to his command. But it is unclear that
the events in June changed that fact. It was commonly thought, by
members of the National Assembly as well as others, that the new
constitution would be valid only if given royal approvaJ.5 The
National Assembly, like the Estates-General that preceded it,
apparently had power only because the King said it did.
But by the time the National Assembly announced its
Declaration of the Rights of Man on August 4--after the storming of
the Bastille on July 14--a legal revolution had occurred. The
authority of the National Assembly no longer depended upon the
royal will. 6 Although the King accepted the Declaration as legally
valid, its legal validity did not depend upon his recognition. 7 His
recognition merely acknowledged an established legal fact.
This Article is about legal revolutions. I use the term "legal
revolutions" to distinguish them from what can be called "political
revolutions," that is, revolutions that are primarily about dramatic
political, social and economic changes. Although both a legal and a
political revolution occurred in 1789, the two need not always
coincide. If Article V procedures were used to pass an amendment to
the United States Constitution that prohibited private property, only
a political, not a legal, revolution would have occurred. Conversely,
although the United States Constitution was probably illegal from the
perspective of the Articles of Confederation (because the procedures
for amending the Articles were ignored when the Constitution was
ratified),8 its ratification was probably only a legal, not a political,
revolution. The political, social and economic changes in 1787 were
minor.9
5. !d. at 112.
6. !d. at 130-31.
7. !d. at 133.
8. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 168 (1991) (noting
that "patriots" at the Constitutional Convention claimed authority, in the name of the
people, to ignore the rules that the Articles of Confederation specified to govern their own
revision); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 475, 476-77 (1995) (noting that the reformers to the Constitution did not play by the
established rules for amendment but tried to compensate for their legal deficiencies
through a remarkable bootstrapping process).
9. For example, there was no political resistance to the new "illegal" Constitution.
Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 191, 214 n. 45 (1995). For a description of the political continuity between the two
legal systems, see Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the
Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMM. 463,475-77 (2004).
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Legal revolutions are a favored theme in the legal academy. 10 A
recent example is the charge that Bush v. Gore 11 was a "judicial
coup." 12 At the very least, this means that the Supreme Court's
10. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCfURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (explaining the constitutional
revolution of the "New Deal" Court under the Roosevelt administration); Guyora Binder,
What's Left?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (1991) (arguing that revolutionary movements are an
important type of social setting for the construction and articulation of political values);
J.M. Eekelaar, Principles of Revolutionary Legality, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 22 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (exploring the role of the judiciary in
preserving pre-existing legal norms leading up to and following a revolution); J.M. Finnis,
Revolutions and Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 44 (A.W.B.
Simpson ed., 1973) (criticizing Hans Kelsen's theory of legal discontinuity, which defines a
revolution as any illegal change in a nation's constitution, as arbitrary and ambiguous);
Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995) (analyzing the
opinions of the 1994 Term of the Supreme Court in light of the ideas of revolution,
constitutional change, and legal continuity); J.W. Harris, When and Why Does the
Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103 (1971) (discussing the legal revolutions of
Pakistan, Uganda and Southern Rhodesia); A.M. Honore, Reflections on Revolutions, 2
IRISH JURIST 268 (1967) (discussing how laws and legal systems evolve out of revolutions);
T.C. Hopton, Grundnorm and Constitution: The Legitimacy of Politics, 24 MCGILL L.J. 72
(1978) (discussing the flaws in the logic of the Rhodesian judiciary's decisions impacting
the Rhodesian legal revolution); Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism and Revolution, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1993) (providing a critique of conference papers on the
constitutional relevance of eighteenth-century revolutions to the modern European
revolutions of 1989-91, and concluding that constitutional theory can help clarify the
arguments but cannot effectively inform the practical solutions to modern constitutional
options); Ali Khan, A Legal Theory of Revolutions, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1987) (suggesting
a theoretical framework for judicial analysis of revolution and arguing that revolutions
gain legitimacy and legal authority only through social acceptance of succession rules and
of the revolution itself); Robert Justin Lipkin, Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and
Constitutional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988) (discussing the importance
of recognizing constitutional revolutions and criticizing the failure of Ronald Dworkin's
theory of "law as integrity" to consider the pragmatic side of such revolutions); Robert
Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701 (1989)
(presenting the theory of constitutional revolutions as two distinct movementsrevolutionary adjudication and normal adjudication-and arguing that the theory of
constitutional revolutions better explains and resolves the current law than a coherence or
unitaristic theory); David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 577 (1993) (analyzing America's constitutionalism in terms of its
historical revolutions-first from the principles that led to the American Revolution and
then the battle over those constitutional principles in the Civil War, leading to the
Reconstruction Amendments); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 TermForeword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,
113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 31 (1999) (stating that it "seems useful to think about U.S.
constitutional history as constituting of a succession of regimes").
11. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
12. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1108 (2001 ); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, Off Balance,
in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 192, 199 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002)
(describing the "revolutionary jurisprudence" behind the decision); Ward Farnsworth,
"To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86
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decision was illegal.U But the word "coup" suggests more than that.
A coup is an act that, although illegal from the perspective of the
legal system within which it occurred, becomes legal through a
revolutionary change of legal systems. To be a coup, popular
acceptance of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore must
have lifted us out of one legal realm and placed us into another, the
way events in 1789 lifted France out of absolute monarchy and into
democracy. 14
Despite the hold that revolutions have on the legal imagination, 15
there has been a reluctance to consider the structure of legal systems
that makes discontinuity between them possible. A legal revolution
occurs when chains of legal justification are broken. Although these
chains had led to one ultimate lawmaker (e.g., Louis XVI), they now
lead to another (e.g., the National Assembly or the people of France).
Legal revolutions are possible only assuming laws are structured into
legal systems in this fashion. And yet there is little discussion of just
what this structure is like.
The goal of this Article is to begin to fill this gap by examining
six mistakes concerning legal revolutions that arise when the structure
of legal systems is ignored. My discussion will focus on concrete
examples of these mistakes, drawn from a wide variety of sources,
including the writings of Akhil Amar (who will provide a particularly
rich source), the Supreme Court of Pakistan's validation of a coup in
1958, the nineteenth-century legal theory of John Austin and
criticisms of Bush v. Gore.
In the end, I hope to show that a formalist approach has a place
within legal theory. The anti-formalist bias in the United States has
made legal scholars deeply suspicious of viewing the law as a
structured system. 16 This suspicion, I will argue, has allowed
MINN. L. REv. 227, 228 (2001) (arguing that the decision in Bush v. Gore was "lawless"
and the use of an "extralegal judicial power.").
13. See Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 228-35.
14. See infra Section VI. C.
15. Another example of academic interest in legal revolutions is Bruce Ackerman's
and Akhil Amar's long-standing dispute about the legality of the ratification of the
Constitution. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41-42, 167-99
(1991); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456
(1989); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 463-86 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent);
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047-50 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia).
16. In showing the benefits of a structural approach to legal systems, I hope to
vindicate the form of legal analysis first employed in the early twentieth century by the
Vienna School of legal theory, and especially by Hans Kelsen. I will borrow liberally,
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fundamental errors of leg.al reasoning to exist undetected.

I. FIRST MISTAKE: LEGALLY JUSTIFYING LEGAL AXIOMS
A.

Legal Axioms

A law can exist only as part of a system of lawsY Consider
section 205.3(b)(l) of Volume 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
which requires attorneys practicing before the Securities Exchange
Commission to report evidence of material securities violations. 18
This law is a command, in the sense that it establishes a standard of
conduct for behavior. 19 We can determine the system to which this
command belongs by identifying the authorization that gives it
validity. Authorizations are laws that confer upon the authorized
party the power to create new law, whether that new law is a
command or a further authorization. 20 Authorizations and commands
are fundamental elements out of which legal systems are built-the
laws in a legal system can be categorized as authorizations or
commands.21
albeit selectively, from the Vienna School in many of my arguments. See generally
KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992) (1934) [hereinafter
INTRODUCTION] (discussing a theory of law purified of political ideology and empirical
elements); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1967) (1960) [hereinafter PuRE THEORY] (attempting to solve the fundamental problems
of a "pure" theory of law). Other important members of the Vienna School were Adolf
Merkl and Fritz Sander, see generally ADOLF MERKL, ALLGEMEINES
VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1927); ADOLF MERKL, PROLEGOMENA EINER THEORIE DES
RECHTLICHEN
STUFENBAUES
IN
GESELLSCHAFT,
STAAT
UNO
RECHT:
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR REINEN RECHTSLEHRE 252 (Alfred Verdross, ed. 1931); FRITZ
SANDER, DAS FAKTUM DER REVOLUTION UNO DIE KONTINUITAT DER
RECHTSORDNUNG, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 132 (1919-20).
17. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 1-4 (2d ed. 1980); INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at
55-75.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2004).
19. Kelsen understands commands as directed to officials only. PURE THEORY, supra
note 16, at 114-17. They obligate officials to sanction non-compliance with the identified
standard of conduct. /d. For a discussion of Kelsen's approach, see RONALD MOORE,
LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF KELSEN'S PuRE THEORY
OF LAW 137-40 (1978). Nothing about my analysis here presupposes Kelsen's definition
of a command.
20. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 118; see also MOORE supra note 19, at 77.
21. INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 23-25; PuRE THEORY, supra note 16, at 76-81.
Kelsen understands authorization and command as relationships (of "imputation" or
"Zurechnung") between the elemental legal meanings of events. See Stanley L. Paulson,
Hans Kelsen's Doctrine of Imputation, 14 RATIO JURIS 47 (2001). These relationships
build up complex legal meanings by a "functional connection[s] of elements," similar to
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In the case of section 205.3(b )(1), its immediate authorization is
section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"),22
which gave the Securities Exchange Commission the power to
establish minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
practicing before the Commission.23 Sarbanes-Oxley, in turn, is valid
law because Congress was authorized under Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States. "24
Furthermore, the Commerce Clause has remained valid law because
the conventions or legislatures of three-fourths of the states, who are
authorized by Article V to enact amendments to the Constitution,25
refrained from exercising their power to remove the Clause. Finally,
the Commerce Clause and Article V are valid law because Article
VII authorized the conventions of the original thirteen states to enact
the Constitution. 26
This chain cannot go on forever; legal systems must terminate in
a final authorizing law.27 This final law will, of course, have a source
of some sort. In the case of Article VII, the responsible party was the
Constitutional Convention. But whatever this source is, it was not
legally authorized to create the law. There is no law authorizing the
Constitutional Convention to create Article VII, the way there is a
law authorizing the SEC to create section 205.3(b)(l) or Congress to
create Sarbanes-Oxley. We are, of course, free to argue that there is
a law authorizing the Convention, but if we succeed that simply
the way that logical rules build the complex meaning of sentences out of the meaning of
words. See Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA.
L. REV. 365, 388-89 (2003). These details in Kelsen's theory can be ignored for the
purposes of this article.
Kelsen also speaks of positive permissions as another relationship of imputation.
PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 118. But this appears to be nothing more than the
granting of an exception or license to what is generally prohibited behavior. /d. at 138. It
therefore seems reducible to command and authorization.
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2004).
23. /d.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, (2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 'li 86,823 at 87,069-110 (Jan. 29, 2003).
25. U.S. CONST. art. V. That is, if the amendment is proposed by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of Congress or the legislative will of two-thirds of the states. /d.
26. U.S. CONST. art. VII. All thirteen states ratified the Constitution, although it took
North Carolina until November 21, 1789 and Rhode Island (who failed to send any
delegates to the Constitutional Convention) until May 29, 1790. HANNIS TAYLOR, THE
ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 218-19 (1911). For the
pressures to ratify exerted by the new United States upon these two foreign nations in its
midst, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First
Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 835-38 (1994).
27. For a contrary view, see RAZ, supra note 17, at 32.
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means that Article VII is not the final authorizing law. Furthermore,
whoever was responsible for what actually is the final authorizing law
was not legally authorized to create it. 28
If Article VII is the final authorizing law, it is the axiom of the
American legal system. Furthermore, the lawmaker identified by this
axiom-the conventions of the original 13 states-is the supreme
lawmaker in that legal system, the American sovereign. See Figure A.

28. The structure I am employing here follows from the Stufenbau (or hierarchical)
theory of legal norms introduced by Adolf Merkl. See, e.g., Adolf Merkl, Prolegomena
einer Theorie des rechtlichen Stufenbaues in GESELLSCHAFT, STAAT UND RECHT:
UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR REINEN RECHTSLEHRE 252 (Alfred Verdross, ed., 1931).
Merkl strongly influenced Kelsen, who made the Stufenbau approach an essential element
of his legal theory. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 55-75; PURE THEORY, supra
note 16, at 221-78; WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 131-206 (1945)
(photo. reprint 1969); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 95-100 (2d ed. 1980); William
Ebenstein, The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, 59 CAL L. REV.
617,642-44 (1971).
Notably absent from my account, however, is Kelsen's theory of the basic norm.
The basic norm authorizes the creators of the axiom. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16,
at 58; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 199, 226; Green, supra note 21, at 388-89. It is not
itself positive law-that is, a law actually issued by a person-the way Article VII is.
Green, supra note 21, at 388-89. The basic norm is instead presupposed by anyone who
knows the laws of the legal system. /d. For example, anyone who knows American law
must be presupposing a norm that authorized the Constitutional Congress to make Article
VII. /d. Kelsen's theory of the basic norm is motivated in large respect by the Kantian
dimensions of his legal theory, which need not concern us here. See id. at 389-405;
Norbert Leser, Die Reine Rechtslehre im Widerstreit der philosophischen ldeen, in DIE
REINE RECHTSLEHRE IN WISSENSCHAFTLICHER DISKUSSION 97, 101-02 (1982);
CARSTEN HEIDEMANN, DIE NORM ALS TATSACHE: ZUR NORMENTHEORIE HANS
KELSENS 348-50 (1997). On Kelsen's Kantianism generally, see Green, supra note 21;
Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction, in INTRODUCTION, supra note 7, at v; Alida Wilson, Is
Kelsen Really a Kantian?, in ESSAYS ON KELSEN 37 (Richard Tur & William Twining eds.,
1986).
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Figure A

,

.

The inability to trace a law that is now considered valid back to
what was the sovereign in a legal system means that a legal revolution
has occurred. For example, a revolution occurred in France in 1789,
because valid laws were no longer traceable back to Louis XVI. The
American Revolution occurred because, at some point between 1776
and 1783, valid laws could no longer be traced back to the sovereign
within the British legal system-the King-in-Parliament. 29

B.

Legal Axioms Cannot Be Legally Justified

Unlike the other laws within a legal system, a legal axiom does
not have a legal justification, in the sense that it cannot be shown to
be valid in light of a higher authorization.3° This can make the axiom
29. See VERNON BOGDANOR, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON
BRITISH GOVERNMENT 5 (1996) ("[T]here is a sense in which the British Constitution can
be summed up in eight words: What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law."); see also
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 9-10 (1999) (arguing that the essence of the seventeenth century King-inParliament's sovereignty was that "no other human agency possess[ed]legal authority to
override or hold invalid any statute that Parliament enact[ed]").
30. As Kelsen put it: "[T]o attempt juristically to determine the choice of juristic
starting point would be like trying to climb on one's own shoulders; it would be like the
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and the sovereign it authorizes look illegitimate. But to the extent
that an attempt to justify the axiom is not circular, it will distort the
very legal system it is supposed to support.
To illustrate, imagine that someone in 1788 used a decision by a
French court that said Louis XVI was an absolute monarch to legally
justify his absolute monarchy. If Louis was an absolute monarch, this
justification would be circular. The court's authority to make
determinations of the law would exist only because of Louis XVI's
power. And if the person justifying Louis's authority attempted to
remove this circularity by insisting that Louis XVI had his authority
only because the courts of France said so, this would make the courts,
not Louis, sovereign.
When a justification of a legal axiom appeals to laws issued by a
subordinate lawmaker within that legal system, it distorts the
structure of the system by making this subordinate supreme. When it
appeals to laws issued by a lawmaker in another legal system, it
merges two systems into one. For example, imagine someone in 1787
attempted to justify the axiom of the American legal system by
reference to British law. One possibility would be the Treaty of Paris
of 1783, in which Great Britain recognized the United States. 31
Another would be the recognition of American law by British courts,
that is, the willingness of these courts to apply American law to
events occurring within territory claimed by the United States. 32
Although these justifications may make sense of the role of
American law within the British legal system, they distort the
American legal system itself. First of all, there is no reason that
British law should recognize American laws as valid for the same
reason that they are valid within the American legal system itself.
From the perspective of British law, the axiom of the American
system, which we are assuming is Article VII, may be irrelevant. The
British might consider American laws to be valid because they have
their source in a government that is efficacious-in the sense that its
commands tend to be obeyed by the population.
attempt of Miinchhausen to pull himself out of the swamp by his own hair." HANS
KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERANITAT UNO DIE THEORIE DES VOLKERRECHTS
97 (1920).
31. Or, more correctly, the thirteen states. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3,
1783, art. I, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, 81 , reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776--1818, 151 (Hunter
Miller ed., 1931).
32. By the time of the Treaty of Paris, foreign law was employed by English common
law courts in cases having a foreign element. Alexander N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the
History of the English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342, 398 (1937).
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Because Britons and Americans may use different criteria for
determining the validity of American law, a revolutionary change of
the American legal system may not be seen as such under British law.
Assume, for example, that Congress decides to repeal the Fourteenth
Amendment by a simple majority vote and the President signs the
repeal. Assume further that the American public, after considerable
grumbling, acquiesces and the repeal is treated as law. From the
perspective of the American legal system, this would be a legal
revolution because the repeal, although now accepted as legally valid,
could not be traced back to the authority identified in Article VII.
But from the perspective of the British legal system, the American
legal system might exist unchanged because the same cast of
characters in the American government, namely Congress and the
President, is obeyed by the population.
The most significant distortion of justifying American laws by
reference to British law, however, is that it makes the validity of
American laws ultimately depend upon the sovereign within the
British system. The American system and its laws will have their
ultimate validity in the King-in-Parliament. There would be no
independent American legal system.
As a consequence, the American Revolution would not really
have occurred. If American laws were valid only because of their
recognition by the British system, then valid laws in English-speaking
North America would have remained uniformly traceable back to the
King-in-Parliament. Before the recognition, all valid laws would be
traceable back to that source, for the simple reason that the only valid
laws were British ones. After the recognition, there would be valid
American laws, but they, too, would be traceable back to the King-inParliament, through the act of recognition. See Figure B.
Figure B
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The American legal system is no less distorted when its axiom is
justified by reference to international law. Once again, Article VII
may not be relevant under international law. Efficacy, or some other
principle, may matter instead. Furthermore, such a justification
ultimately makes the validity of American laws depend upon the
axiom of the international system.33 Such justification leaves no place
for an independent American legal system. All that would exist is an
international system, within which the American system played a
subordinate role. The same would hold true for those other domestic
legal systems that owed their existence only to recognition under
international law. See Figure C.
Figure C

. --------------·····················-··········--_)

From the perspective of the international legal system,
revolution would be impossible. To be sure, changes in domestic
legal systems would occur from within the international system, in the

33. For the purposes of this Article, we shall have to leave the questions of the axiom
and sovereign of the international system vague. For a discussion of these issues, see
INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 107-08; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 318-20. The
international legal system could be primary even though, having no organs of
enforcement, it had to rely upon the actions of subordinate domestic legal systems to
enforce its laws. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 108-11; PURE THEORY, supra
note 16, at 320-22. This would be analogous to a domestic legal system that engaged only
in lawmaking and adjudication, leaving enforcement to private individuals. See
INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 108-11; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 320-22.
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sense that the changes followed from the international system's
principle for recognizing domestic systems (which, we can assume, is
efficacy). For example, the American Revolution would have
occurred within the international system, because some time between
1776 and 1783 the American government (or the state governments)
supplanted the King-in-Parliament as the efficacious lawmakers
among most English-speakers in North America. At that point
American (or state) and not British law became valid under
international law. This change would not be a legal revolution,
however, for the axiom on the basis of which the old and the new laws
are justified would remain the same. Both British law and the
American law that supplanted it would be valid only because of the
principle of efficacy, which owes its validity to the axiom of the
international legal system. The ultimate principle of legal validity
would not change.
C.

Amar on the American Axiom

In short, legal systems and revolutionary changes of these
systems can be understood only if legal axioms are left legally
unjustified. Our first mistake concerning legal revolutions occurs
when this lesson is forgotten. An example of this mistake can be
found in the writings of Akhil Amar. 34 I will begin, however, with
Amar's novel account of the American legal system.
I have suggested that the axiom of the American legal system is
Article VII and that the lawmaker identified in that axiom-the
conventions of the thirteen original states-is the American
sovereign. Amar also takes the ratification of the Constitution to be
important in identifying the American sovereign. But he believes the
true axiom of our legal system is not Article VIJ.35 It is instead the
more comprehensive "legal right of the polity to alter or abolish their
government at any time and for any reason, by a peaceful and simple
majoritarian process. "36
34. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
35. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 470-75.
36. !d. at 458. See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican
Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 749, 750 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Denominator] ("At the Founding, the
very act of constitution itself-of ordainment and establishment-embodied the first
principles of Republican Government: the right of the sovereign people, via a special
convention, to alter their existing constitution by simple majority vote."); Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435-36 (1987) [hereinafter
Amar, Sovereignty] (describing the essence of popular sovereignty in America as "the
right of the People to alter or abolish their government .... "); Amar, Philadelphia, supra
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In fact, Amar argues that this right of popular sovereignty is the
axiom of fourteen different legal systems. It is the axiom of each of
the thirteen state systems that existed prior to ratification, and it is the
axiom of the American legal system that was the result of the
ratification. 37 In each of the fourteen systems a different people are
sovereign. In each state system, the people of that state are
sovereign, and, in the American legal system, the people of the
United States as a whole are sovereign. Within each state system, a
constitution for that state can be created, without revolution, by a
simple process in which the majority of the people of that state vote
for the constitution. 38 Likewise, within the American legal system, a
constitution for the United States can be created, without revolution,
by a simple process in which the majority of the people of the United
States as a whole vote for the constitution. 39
Amar believes that Article VII played a crucial role in bridging
the gap between the sovereignty of the state peoples and the
sovereignty of the people of the United States. Indeed, its most
important function was not establishing the Constitution, but
enabling this delegation of sovereignty. After the delegation, the
method by which future constitutions could be legally created was
radically altered. Prior to the delegation, each state people, being
sovereign, could not be bound by law that did not have its source in
that people's will. Article VII respected this sovereignty of the state
peoples, Amar argues, because each people had to agree individually
to delegate its sovereignty.40 Although the Article VII process was
effective with the ratification of nine of the thirteen states, the effect
was only "between the States so ratifying the [Constitution]."41 After
the delegation was complete, however, sovereignty rested in a new
people, the people of the United States. That new sovereign could
create constitutions in the future by its simple majority vote. If the
people of the United States voted for a new constitution, it would be
binding, even if the people of an individual state objected.
Because the American people are now sovereign, the American
note 15, at 1044 (stating that "the first, most undeniable inalienable and important, if
unenumerated right of the People is the right of a majority of voters to amend the
Constitution .... ").
37. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 488 n. 15; Amar, Denominator, supra note 36, at
767; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062--{)3.
38. Amar, Denominacor, supra note 36, at 773; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at
1051-52.
39. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 458-59, 501.
40. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1459--{)0.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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legal system can endure even if there is dramatic constitutional
change, for example, the wholesale scrapping of the Constitution and
its replacement by a parliamentary government of the British variety.
Valid laws will still be traceable back to the same sovereign, as long as
the constitutional change is ratified democratically by the majority of
the American people as a whole. For this reason, Amar argues that
Article V is not the sole method of constitutional change within our
legal system. It is merely a means of constitutional change from
within our current Constitution. The people can make Article V
irrelevant, however, by enacting a new constitution through a simple
majoritarian process.
I will argue in Part V that the alienation of sovereignty that
Amar attributes to the Article VII process is impossible, which forces
him into the position that the ratification was as much of a revolution
as the independence of the thirteen state legal systems from the
British system. Indeed, the belief that a sovereign can alienate or
limit its authority (as well as the belief that it can authorize its own
authority) is the fifth mistake concerning legal revolutions. My
current goal, however, is to show that even if Amar is right about
Article VII, he succumbs to the first mistake concerning legal
revolutions, because he offers legal justifications for why the people
are sovereign within the state systems.
To his credit, Amar does not argue that popular sovereignty is
the axiom of these systems simply because a popular vote is the
morally valid means of creating a constitution for a people. 42 If this
were his argument, he would have to accept that popular sovereignty
is the axiom of every legal system-for if the American peoples have
a moral right to control the constitution under which they live, so do
all other peoples.
If all laws depended upon such moral validation, the American
Revolution would not have occurred. After all, the (unwritten)
British constitution, which gave lawmaking authority to the King-inParliament, was not ratified by any of the American peoples-and
not by the British people either, at least in the eighteenth century.
From the perspective of the axiom of popular sovereignty, British
laws that applied to the Colonies before the American Revolution,
indeed British laws as a whole, were void. Instead of a revolutionary
change in valid law, abiding sovereigns-namely the peoples of the
states-would have finally spoken.

42. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 499.

HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 345 2004-2005

346

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

In fact, if the moral axiom of popular sovereignty were the axiom
of every legal system, no revolutions would have ever occurred. The
peoples of the world would always be the ultimate source of valid law,
and any putative law from another source would simply be void.
Louis XVI decrees before 1789 would not be valid laws, since they
could not be traced to the true sovereign, the people of France.
There would be no revolutions-that is, shifts of sovereignty-only
cases of abiding sovereigns choosing to speak or falling into silence.
Furthermore, because the valid laws of each domestic system
would be traceable back to the same moral axiom, these laws would
inhabit the same moral/international legal system. The difference
between the valid laws of France and valid laws of the United States
would be no more significant than the difference between laws
enacted by subsidiary lawmakers within the American legal system
(such as Congress and the state legislatures). See Figure D.
FigureD
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Instead of offering such a moral argument, Amar claims that
particular social events in English-speaking North America
established popular sovereignty as the legal axiom of the American
systems by the time of the Founding. These events gave the pre-

HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 346 2004-2005

2005]

LEGAL REVOLUTIONS

347

existing moral right to choose one's government a "legal form that it
lacked before 1776. " 43
This means that popular sovereignty is not the ultimate legal
basis for constitutional validity in all legal systems. It did not apply in
the French legal system before 1789 (and maybe not even after). And
because it also did not apply to the eighteenth century British legal
system, there was an American Revolution. Sovereigns changedultimate lawmaking authority shifted from the King-in-Parliament to
the American peoples.
But Amar's argument that popular sovereignty became the
axiom of the state legal systems by the late eighteenth century
succumbs to the first mistake. Trained to give legal arguments, he
cannot help but give further legal justifications for why popular
sovereignty was the law. But this is precisely what Amar should not
do. If these justifications are non-circular, which they must to be
justifications at all, the principle of popular sovereignty must legally
depend upon the authority standing behind the law to which he
appeals. The sovereignty of the people will be extinguished because
the ultimate source of valid law will be this new authority.
Of course, the most serious problem for Amar-to which I have
already alluded and which I discuss in greater detail in Part V-is his
argument that popular sovereignty is the axiom of the American legal
system because it had that role in the state legal systems. Unless the
delegation of sovereignty is possible, such a justification threatens to
make the validity of American law dependent upon the sovereigns of
the state legal systems. American law would be binding upon a state
only to the extent that the people of the state say so. These peoples
could extinguish their legal obligations under American law at will, as
the people of South Carolina attempted to do in 1861.
But Amar's arguments put even the sovereignty of the people of
each state at risk. For example, he offers the statement in Virginia's
Declaration of Rights that "all power is vested in, and consequently
derived from, the people" as having "established popular sovereignty
as [Virginia's] legal cornerstone."44 And yet the Virginia Declaration
was a product of the Virginia state legislature. The people of Virginia
did not grant the legislature the authority to enact it, nor did they
subsequently ratify it. 45 If the Declaration really established the

43. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 464; see also id. at 462-87 (describing gradual
entrenchment of popular sovereignty as the ultimate justification of legality in the states).
44. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 477.
45. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L.
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Virginian people's lawmaking power, they have lawmaking authority
only because the Virginia state legislature gave it to them. The
legislature, not the people, would be sovereign. Of course, Amar can
insist that the state legislature itself has lawmaking authority only
because the people gave it this power. But the Declaration cannot
legally justify this fact.
Amar must be understood, not as legally justifying the axiom of
popular sovereignty, but as extra-legally explaining why the peoples
of the states were in legal systems in which popular sovereignty was
the axiom. 46 If he is successful, he will have shown why legal
justification stopped at popular sovereignty without the need for
further legal justification-precisely what Amar himself is so
reluctant to do. The statement in the Declaration, rather than being
an act of lawmaking, would simply be the exemplification of popular
sovereignty's axiomatic role among those legally reasoning within the
system.

D. Amar on the Articles of Confederation
The first mistake can also be found in Amar's argument that
there was no revolutionary break between the Articles of the
Confederation and the ratification of the Constitution. Actually,
there are three possible revolutions at issue here, each of which Amar
denies occurred: (1) a revolutionary creation of one American legal
system out of the state legal systems at the time of the Articles of
Confederation; (2) a revolutionary recreation of the state legal
systems through the dissolution of the Articles; and (3) a
revolutionary creation (or recreation) of the American legal system
out of the state systems with the ratification of the Constitution.
The Articles and the Constitution look legally discontinuous
because the Constitution was not ratified in accordance with the
amendment procedures of the Articles. 47 Under Article VII of the
Constitution, the "Ratification of the Conventions of nine States" was
sufficient for the establishment of the Constitution "between the
States so ratifying the Same."48 If nine state conventions agreed, they
could legally obligate their states to abide by the new Constitution.
In contrast, under Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, valid
amendment required the approval of Congress and the confirmation
REV. 475,486 n.30 (1995).
46. See infra Section II.A.
47. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 8, at 478-80.
48. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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of the legislatures of every State.49 The agreement of nine state
conventions would therefore be a legal nullity.
Amar escapes this problem by arguing that the Articles
themselves were no longer binding in 1787:
Of course, Article VII is inconsistent with the best reading of
Article XIII, but to declare Article VII therefore illegal is to
beg the question of the legal status of Article XIII, and the rest
of the Articles of Confederation, in 1787. I believe, as did many
Federalists in 1787, that the Articles of Confederation were a
mere treaty among thirteen otherwise free and independent
nations. That treaty had been notoriously, repeatedly, and
flagrantly violated on every side by 1787. Under standard
principles of international law, these material breaches of a
treaty freed each party-that is, each of the thirteen states-to
disregard the pact, if it so chose. Thus, if in 1787 nine (or more)
states wanted, in effect, to secede from the Articles of
Confederation and form a new system, that was their legal right,
Article XIII notwithstanding. 50
If Amar is correct that the state legal systems possessed full
independence at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, his
sole problem is the third revolution-the transfer of sovereignty from
the peoples of the states to the people of the United States through
the ratification of the Constitution. I have set aside this problem until
Part V.
But Amar's argument that the states were released from their
obligations under the Articles suffers from the first mistake. Assume
he is right that the Articles were a treaty between independent
states. 51 If so, the legal obligations created by the Articles must be
traceable back to the ultimate authority within each state system,
namely the people of that state. The powers of the United States
government under the Articles would exist for a state only as long as

49. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777).
50. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1048. See also Amar, Consent, supra note
15, at 465-66 (1994) ("By 1787, the Articles had been routinely and flagrantly violated on
all sides. And under well-established legal principles in 1787, these material breaches
freed each compacting party-each state-to disregard the pact, if it so chose.").
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also Charles Fried, Foreword:
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 21 (1995) ("Under the Articles, residual political
authority remained in the thirteen states"). See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II
(1777) ("Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled.").
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these powers were recognized by its people. Indeed, there would be
no such thing as an American legal system or American law. Instead
there would be thirteen separate state legal systems, containing
incommensurable sets of state laws called "American law." 52 See
Figure E.
Figure E

But if the people of each state are sovereign within their legal
system, why is Amar concerned to show that the states were released
from their legal obligations under the Articles? Whatever obligations
New Hampshire had under the Articles were obligations only because
the people of New Hampshire said so. And by deciding to ignore the
Articles, including their amendment procedures, the people of New
Hampshire made it clear that the Articles no longer had any legal
force.
By appealing to principles of international law that apparently
bind the people of New Hampshire independently of their consent,
52. The Articles put upon every state an obligation to "abide by the determinations of
the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are
submitted to them." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777). It also declared
the "Union" to be "perpetual." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777). But
these can be understood as legal obligations that flowed from and were dependent upon
the abiding consent of the people of each state.
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Amar has once again threatened the very sovereignty he aims to
defend. If the people of New Hampshire could escape their
obligations under the Articles only by satisfying standards of
international law, then their sovereignty would be lost even if they did
succeed in escaping their obligations. The legal fact that the people
of New Hampshire were released from their obligations could not be
traced to the will of the people of New Hampshire. This binding
international law would have to be explained in terms of some other
sovereign, for example, the sovereign of the international legal system
(whatever that is).
To make Amar's position consistent, we have to reinterpret his
appeal to international law. For example, we could understand him
as speaking of the moral concerns that motivated the people of New
Hampshire to exercise their legal power to extinguish New
Hampshire's obligations under the Articles. The people of New
Hampshire were not legally bound to respect such moral concerns.
They could have extinguished New Hampshire's obligations for no
reason at all. But, as a matter of fact, the violation of the terms of the
Articles by other states was the reason they chose to exercise this
plenary power. 53

53. There are, in fact, two other avenues for making Amar's appeal to international
law consistent, although Amar himself would be unwilling to accept them. I have so far
assumed that the sovereign has unrestricted lawmaking authority (except insofar as it may
not make laws that alter its own authority). I have also assumed that the sovereign is
indivisible. If these restrictions on sovereignty were set aside, as I believe they should, we
could make sense of legal limits that would prevent the sovereign people of New
Hampshire from simply negating the Articles at will. For example, one could argue that
under the axiom of the New Hampshire legal system the people of New Hampshire have
supreme lawmaking power only to the extent that they did not violate certain treaty
obligations. These limitations would not be part of international law, since they would not
be commanded by the sovereign of the international legal system (or indeed by any
sovereign), but it would nevertheless be true that the people of New Hampshire were
legally bound by them. See infra Section III.B.
Another possibility is to assume divided sovereignty. On international issues the
sovereign responsible for international law (whatever that is) would have supreme
lawmaking authority and on domestic issues the people of New Hampshire would. The
people of New Hampshire would be a supreme lawmaker, but only within a domestic
realm. They would be bound by the decisions of the international sovereign as far as their
ability to withdraw from the Articles was concerned. See infra Section Ill. C.
But Amar would not accept either of these approaches, because he assumes
(mistakenly, as we shall see) that sovereignty cannot be limited or divided. See Amar,
Consent, supra note 15, at 507; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062--63; Amar,
Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435.
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II. SECOND MISTAKE: CONFUSING EXTRA-LEGAL EXPLANATIONS
WITH LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS

As we have seen, legal systems will be misunderstood if axioms
are legally justified. And yet it seems that some explanation must be
given for why legal justification should stop at one axiom rather than
another.
Imagine that someone claimed that the Queen-inParliament is the current sovereign of all of English-speaking North
America. When confronted with laws, like Sarbanes-Oxley, that
appear to be valid and not traceable to the Queen-in-Parliament's
commands, he dug in his heels, arguing that these laws only seem
valid because we are assuming the wrong axiom. Once one
recognizes that the Queen-in-Parliament is the sovereign, these
"laws" reveal themselves to be nullities.
Because it is an axiom, we cannot, by definition, legally justify
our choice over his. We can, however, explain why this person is an
outlier-that is, why almost everyone in this country stops legal
justification at Article VII (or something similar) rather than "what
the Queen-in-Parliament says is law." This explanation cannot be a
legal justification, of course, since the axiom is an axiom precisely
because it has no such justification. The explanation must be extralegal in nature. The confusion of this extra-legal explanation of a
legal axiom with its legal justification is our second mistake
concerning legal revolutions.
A.

Extra-legal Explanations of Legal Axioms

I have chosen the deliberately vague term "explanation,"
because it does not commit us to the view that the axiom can be
reduced to what explains it. An example of a legal theorist who
believes that legal axioms can be extra-legally explained, but who
resists extra-legal reductionism, is Hans Kelsen. Kelsen accepts that
An
legal axioms can be explained in terms of social facts.
authorization, he argues, is treated as the axiom of a legal system if it
is efficacious, that is, if the population by and large obeys the laws
identified by the authorization.54 But he insists that the axiom-and
all other legal rules-cannot be reduced to such social facts. 55 Legal
rules are irreducibly legal in nature.
54. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 210 ("As soon as the old constitution loses its
effectiveness and the new one has become effective, the acts that appear with the
subjective meaning of creating or applying legal norms are no longer interpreted by
presupposing the old basic norm, but by presupposing the new one.").
55. INTRODUCfiON, supra note 16, at 13-14; PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at 2.
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Kelsen's position is comparable to the position in the philosophy
of logic called "logicism." Consider an axiom of logic-that is, a
logical rule, such as the law of non-contradiction, that is foundational
and so cannot be logically justified. The logicist admits that why we
accept the law of non-contradiction without justification can be
explained physiologically, psychologically and sociologically, for
example, in terms of the constitution of our brains, certain innate
habits or instincts, and socialization by parents and teachers. He does
not think, however, that the law, or any logical rules, can be reduced
to the empirical facts that explain them. Logical rules are about
logical states of affairs, which are not contingent upon anything
empirical.56
In contrast, some philosophers of logic consider logical rules to
be nothing over and above the physiological, psychological and
sociological facts that explain our acceptance of them. According to
this position, which is sometimes called "psychologism," the law of
non-contradiction is constituted by facts about human brains, desires,
or societies.57 For the psychologist, although the law of noncontradiction cannot be logically justified, it can be empirically
justified, since it is, in the end, reducible to empirical facts.
A possible analogue to psychologism in legal theory is American
legal realism. The realists sought to reduce legal rules to social
facts-especially facts about judicial behavior. 58 For the realists, legal
reasoning is ultimately a type of empirical-especially sociological-

56. Green, supra note 21, at 375--81. For the classic expression of logicism, the view
that logical laws concern abstract objects rather than psychological states, see GOTILOB
FREGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC v-viii, 33-38 (J.L. Austin trans., Basil
Blackwell 2d ed. 1959) (1884); 1 EDMUND HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 99-100
(J.N. Findlay trans., Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970) (1900). On both Husserl's and
Frege's anti-psychologism, see MARTIN KUSCH, PSYCHOLOGISM: A CASE STUDY IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 30--62 (1995).
57. See Richard R. Brockhaus, Realism and Psychologism in 19th Century Logic, 51
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 493, 495-96, 500-06 (1991). A classic expression of
psychologism is 1 JOHN STEWART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 2 (Longman, Green & Co.
1936) (1851 ).
58. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWS 8 (1942); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM . L. REV. 809, 828-29 (1935); Walter Wheeler Cook,
Essay, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 49, 5758 (Julius Rosenthal Found., Northwestern Univ. ed. 1987) (1941); Underhill Moore,
Essay, in id. at 203; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 3-44
(1986). The legal realists often pointed to Holmes' famous statement in Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897) , as anticipating this
approach: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
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inquiry.
Although Kelsen and the legal realists are relatively clear about
where they stand, other legal theorists are more difficult to
categorize. Consider H.L.A. Hart. On the one hand, Hart appears to
reduce the rule of recognition, which, as we shall see, he considers to
be the foundation of a legal system, to social facts. 59 On the other
hand, Hart argues that attending to the internal perspective of the
participants in the legal system is needed to avoid the purely external
sociological approach of the legal realists. 60 Hart's commitment to the
internal point of view looks like a rejection of sociological
reductionism and, for that reason, could put him in the same camp as
Kelsen. 61 From within the internal perspective of the participants, the
existence of the rule of recognition is completely irrelevant to legal
justification.
If this reading of Hart is correct, then he is much like Kelsen in
insisting that sociological explanation of legal axioms should not
infect legal justification. Sociology can at most explain why legal
justification stops at the axiom; it cannot actually justify the axiom. I
shall adopt the Kelsen-Hart approach in this Article-and attempt a
justification of this choice in the Conclusion. The second mistake
concerning legal revolutions arises when the distinction between
extra-legally explaining and legally justifying a legal axiom is
forgotten.
Let me begin by outlining in greater detail Hart's explanation of
legal axioms. 62 Hart explains legal axioms, and the legal systems
generated from them, through rules of recognition, that is, practices
among officials of enforcing norms only if they satisfy certain criteria.
(He also argues that the bulk of the population must generally
comply with what the rule of recognition determines to be valid laws.)
For example, the rule of recognition of the British legal system is,
59. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 110 (Penelope Bulloch & Joseph Raz
eds., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1994) ("[T]he rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but
normally concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the
law by reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact.").
60. /d. at 104-05.
61. See Jeffrey D. Goldsworthy, The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism, 10 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 450-51 (1990). For more discussion of the internal point of view in
Hart, see Brian Bix, H. L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L.
REV. 167, 172-76 (1999); Richard Holton, Positivism and the Internal Point of View, 17
LAW & PHIL. 597,600-06 (1998); Dennis Patterson, Explicating the Internal Point of View,
52 SMU L. REV. 67,69-72 (1999).
62. I use Hart's explanation of legal axioms because it is more developed than
Kelsen's. I do so even though the lesson of distinguishing explanation from justification is
clearer in Kelsen's work than Hart's. See Green, supra note 21, at 398-405.
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roughly, the practice among British officials of enforcing only those
norms that have their ultimate source in the Queen-in-Parliament. 63
A revolution, in turn, occurs when one rule of recognition is replaced
by another. 64
According to Hart, when someone describes the conditions for
legal validity, the person is either participating within a rule of
recognition or describing the internal perspective of participants. 65
The rule of recognition can therefore extra-legally explain the axiom
of a system, insofar as it shows what participants take to be the
ultimate criterion for determining whether a norm should be
enforced. For example, Article VII .is the axiom of the American
legal system if participants in the American rule of recognition stop
legal justification at Article VII without any felt need for further
justification.
Hart's explanation of the axiom of a legal system is not the same
as a legal principle that is used to determine when a subsidiary system
is recognized by a primary legal system. The two are easy to confuse,
because Hart's explanation looks very much like a commonly
accepted legal principle of recognition, namely the principle of
efficacy. The existence of a rule of recognition requires efficacy, in
the sense that the population must generally abide by the laws
identified by the rule. But the recognition of a subsidiary legal system
according to the principle of efficacy, unlike a rule of recognition,
63. Technically, the rule of recognition is not itself a practice. It is instead an abstract
object-perhaps a proposition-that is practiced by a population. Because there is an
infinite number of rules of recognition in this sense, Hart cannot possibly be claiming that
a rule of recognition is the ultimate source of legal validity. There is, after all, a rule of
recognition in which I am emperor of the United States. According to that rule of
recognition, my commands are valid law and Sarbanes-Oxley is not. Hart must instead be
arguing that the ultimate source of legal validity is the social fact that a certain rule of
recognition is practiced by a population. On the distinction between a rule of recognition
and the practice of that rule, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACfiCE OF PRINCIPLE 77-78
(2001). For ease of expression, however, I will ignore this distinction.
64. Hart himself offers the example of the peaceful liberation of a colony from the
United Kingdom. Initially colonial laws are part of the British legal system, because
colonial officials, with the officials of Britain, have a practice of enforcing only those
norms that have their source in the Queen-in-Parliament. See HART, supra note 59, at 120
("[T]he legal system of the colony is plainly a subordinate part of a wider system
characterized by the ultimate rule of recognition that what the Queen in Parliament enacts
is law for (inter alia) the colony."). Eventually, however, "the ultimate rule of recognition
changes, for the legal competence of Westminster Parliament to legislate for the former
colony is no longer recognized by [the colony's) courts." ld. Where there was once one
rule of recognition, and so one legal system, there are now two. The axiom for the new
colonial legal system is no longer "what the Queen-in-Parliament commands is Jaw"; it is
something like "what the colonial legislature commands is Jaw." ld.
65. HART, supra note 59, at 90-91, 242.
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does not explain the independent existence of the recognized legal
system. The laws of the recognized system instead depend upon the
axiom of the recognizing system. For this reason, a change of
recognized legal systems, unlike a change of rules of recognition, is
not a legal revolution.
Although a primary legal system's principle for legally
recognizing subsidiary legal systems is usually very similar to Hart's
explanation of the axiom of a legal system, they can diverge.
Consider Hart's example (written in 1961):
We are, in fact, quite clear that the legal system in existence in
the territory of the Soviet Union is not in fact that of the Tsarist
regime. But if a statute of the British Parliament declared that
the law of Tsarist Russia was still the law of Russian territory
this would indeed have meaning and legal effect as part of
English law referring to the USSR, but it would leave
unaffected the truth of the statement of fact contained in our
last sentence. The force and meaning of the statute would be
merely to determine the law to be applied in English courts,
and so in England, to cases with a Russian element.66
Although the Soviet rule of recognition and so the Soviet legal system
exist, the Soviet system does not satisfy the English principle for
recognizing subsidiary legal systems.
Because Hart offers an explanation of the axiom of a system, not
a legal justification of the axiom, the explanation will not be appealed
to when reasoning within the system. To the extent that one treats
the existence of the rule of recognition itself as a legal justification for
the axiom, one is not being true to the internal perspective of the
participants in the rule and not accurately describing legal validity. 67
For example, assume that there is a rule of recognition according
to which Louis XVI's word is taken as the final criterion for enforcing
a norm. From the perspective of the participants, the existence of the
rule of recognition is legally irrelevant. If it were relevant, there
would be a different rule in place, in which "what Louis commands is
law" is not simply accepted without justification. Instead a further
reason would be demanded by the officials, namely the existence of a
practice among them of accepting "what Louis XVI commands is
law" as law. This would mean the officials are sovereign, not Louis
XVI. France would be transformed from an absolute monarchy into
66. !d. at 119-20.
67. !d. at 1084)9.
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an oligarchy. See Figure F.
Figure F
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Indeed, if such a rule existed, there would have been no French
Revolution. Instead the abiding sovereign, the officials of France,
would have simply changed the subordinate lawmaker to which they
delegated their power from Louis XVI to the National Assembly (or
the people of France it represented). See Figure G.
Figure G
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The point is that the officials either demand a further legal
reason for the axiom or they do not. If they do not, then it is indeed
the axiom. If they do, then whatever they give as a reason for the
axiom is the true axiom (provided that they stop at that). But they
cannot appeal to their very practice of treating the axiom as an axiom
as the legal reason it is an axiom.

B.

Greenawalt on the American Axiom

This does not mean that official acceptance can never
legitimately be an ultimate criterion for valid law. As an example,
consider Kent Greenawalt's attempt to articulate the rule of
recognition of the American legal system.68 Greenawalt questions
whether the legal reason that the United States Constitution69 is valid
law is that it was ratified in accordance with Article VII. 70 He
concludes that the "more accurate modern characterization" is that
the Constitution is valid law because of its "continued acceptance. "71
On the one hand, Greenawalt could be understood as arguing that the
Constitution is simply part of the axiom of the American legal
system-that it is accepted as law without any justification at all. See
Figure H.

68. Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV.
621, 630--660 (1987).
69. Or, more correctly, those original provisions in the Constitution that were not
introduced through Article V amendment procedures.
70. Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 639-40.
71. Id. at 640. He also makes similar claims about some amendments to the
Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Figure H

This, of course, would not be the justification of an axiom by appeal
to a rule of recognition.
On the other hand, Greenawalt might be understood as arguing
that official acceptance is what would be used to legally justify the
Constitution's validity. For example, if a good argument could be
found for why the ratification of the Constitution actually failed to
satisfy Article VII, officials would insist that the Constitution was still
valid law and would give as their reason the fact that it has been
accepted by them as law for a long time.
Assuming that officials did offer such a justification for the
Constitution's validity, rather than simply accepting it as law without
demanding a legal justification at all, Greenawalt still would not have
justified the axiom of our system by reference to the rule of
recognition. Official acceptance would instead be an ultimate
criterion of law under the rule of recognition. "What officials accept
is law" would be the (or part of the) axiom of our legal system.
Officials would be sovereign. To have justified the axiom of our
system by reference to the rule of recognition, Greenawalt would
have had to try to justify legally why official acceptance itself is an
appropriate criterion and to use the fact that the officials accept their
acceptance without justification as the justification.
There may still be reasons to object to Greenawalt's
characterization of the American axiom of course. If Greenawalt is
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right, a (gradual) legal revolution occurred after 1787. In 1787 Article
VII would have been given as the legal justification for the
Constitution's validity, but now official acceptance is. 72 But if there is
a problem with his approach, it is inaccuracy, not incoherence.
C.

State v. Dosso

Although Greenawalt does not make the mistake of using an
extra-legal explanation of an axiom as its legal justification, an
example of this mistake is not hard to find. Consider the case of State
v. Dosso. 73 In 1958, the President of Pakistan, Iskandar Mirza-in an
attempt to circumvent a general election-abrogated the constitution
(which had been promulgated by the Constituent Assembly two years
earlier), dissolved the legislature, and declared martiallaw.74 A mere
twenty days later, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the context of
four consolidated criminal appeals, undertook to determine the legal
validity of the coup. 75
In an opinion by Chief Justice Muhammed Munir, the court
concluded that the coup had generated a new legal system in which
the President's word was law. 76 Granted, the President issued an
order that the country was to be governed "as nearly as may be in
accordance with the late Constitution.'m But the "Constitution" to
which the President referred now existed only because the President
comrp.anded it.78 See Figure I.

72. Greenawalt himself recognizes this fact. !d. at 640.
73. State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. 533 (Pakistan). For a discussion of Dosso and
it~ inter11ational reception, see Tayyab Mahmud, Jurisprudence of Successful Treason:
Coups d'Etat & Common Law, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49 (1994).
74. Mahmud, supra note 73, at 54-57.
75. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 537-43.
76. !d. at 541 ("Under the new legal order any law may at any time be changed by the
President, and therefore there is no such thing as a fundamental right, there being no
restriction on the President's law-making power.").
77. !d. at 538.
78. /d. at 541.
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Furthermore, Munir argued that this new constitutional order
was valid. The reason was the efficacy of the coup, that is, the
conformity of the population and officials to the President's new
decrees:
[I]f the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons
assuming power under the change can successfully require the
inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then
the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because
thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the
annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success. On
the same principle the validity of the laws to be made thereafter
is judged by reference to the new and not the annulled
Constitution.
Thus the essential condition to determine
whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy of the
change.79
There are two ways of understanding this principle of efficacy. On
the one hand, it could be an extra-legal explanation of why a new
legal system exists in which the President's word is law. Let us set this
reading aside for a moment. Another possibility is that it is itself a

79. !d. at 539.
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legal justification of the President's lawmaking power.

One way that the principle could legally justify the President's
lawmaking power is if it was the axiom of the Pakistani legal system.
This would mean that the coup was not a revolution. The situation
would be similar to Amar's account of the American legal system, in
the sense that radical constitutional change would be compatible with
legal continuity. The only difference would be that, in Amar's United
States, constitutional change occurs through popular ratification,
whereas in Munir's Pakistan it occurs through a ruler achieving
efficacy. The establishment of an efficacious system of command
(including through repression) would be for Munir what majority
votes are for Amar: the fundamental means by which valid
constitutions are created within the legal system. Furthermore,
contrary to Munir's own suggestion, it would not be the case that the
axiom of the new legal system is "the President's word is law." The
President would have lawmaking power only because he satisfied the
axiom of efficacy. See Figure J.
Figure J

.,
T
Another interpretation, which is suggested by Munir himself, is that
the principle of efficacy is not the axiom of the Pakistani legal system,
but instead has its source in internationallaw.80 If so, not only would
80. !d. He argued that "a victorious revolution or a successful coup d'etat is an
internationally recognised legal method of changing a Constitution."
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the coup not be a revolution, the President would not even be
sovereign. Instead he would be authorized by the sovereign of the
international legal system. See Figure K.
Figure K

Finally, the principle could be a part of "international law" in the
sense that it is used by a domestic (e.g., American) legal system when
determining whether it should recognize other legal systems. This too
would mean that the coup was not revolutionary and that the
President was a subsidiary lawmaker, now within the other domestic
legal system.
Because Munir appears to believe that the President was
sovereign81 and that his sovereignty was not legally continuous with
the pre-coup regime,82 we cannot understand the principle of efficacy
as a legal justification. It must instead be an extra-legal explanation
(analogous to Hart's) 83 of why a new legal system exists. Munir is
81. /d. at 541.
82. /d. at 538-39.
83 . See supra Section II.A.
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arguing that, as a result of this efficacy, he is now in a legal system in
which legal justifications stop with the axiom "the President's word is
law."
But if that is the case, then Munir cannot perform the task that
he has assigned himself-namely legally justifying the sovereignty of
the President. If Munir really were within a legal system in which
"the President's word is law" is the axiom, no justification of the
President's authority would be possible or needed. He would show
that the President's word is law precisely by not justifying the coup.
Indeed Munir himself admits that a jurist must "presuppose," not
justify, the ultimate constitution in his legal system. 84 The very fact
that Munir feels a need for justification means that this new legal
system is not established. Munir, by trying to argue that the
President's authority needs no justification, shows that it in fact
does. 85
III. THIRD MISTAKE: INCORPORATING THE EXTRA-LEGAL INTO
LEGAL AXIOMS

Our first two mistakes involved the failure to recognize that
axioms cannot be legally justified. The first mistake occurs when
legal justifications are given for axioms (Amar) and the second occurs
when the extra-legal explanations of these axioms are treated as if
they were legal justifications (State v. Dosso ). But the confusion of
the legal and the extra-legal can take more subtle forms. It is
common for legal theorists to incorporate within the axiom of a legal
84. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. S. Ct. at 538.
85. Munir's argument relied to a great extent on Kelsen. /d. at 539. Kelsen, it will be
remembered, argued that the basic norm, which legally validates the first constitution of
the system (that is, the axiom of the system), must be assumed by anyone who has
knowledge of the laws of that system. See supra note 28. Furthermore, he admits that the
basic norm will not be assumed unless the constitution is efficacious, in the sense that
people abide by the laws that the constitution validates. PURE THEORY, supra note 16, at
210 ("As soon as the old constitution loses its effectiveness and the new one has become
effective, the acts that appear with the subjective meaning of creating or applying legal
norms are no longer interpreted by presupposing the old basic norm, but by presupposing
the new one."). But this does not mean that Kelsen understood efficacy as a legal
justification of the validity of the constitution. It is an explanation of why the constitution
is assumed to be valid, not a condition of its validity. See supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text; Green, supra note 21, at 401-02; Mahmud, supra note 73, at 110-13.
Munir's misunderstanding of Kelsen is very common, for example, JULIUS STONE, LEGAL
SYSTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONING 103-04 (1964), and has often been the source of
inappropriate criticisms of Kelsen himself. R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 413 (3d ed.
1970); W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 285 (5th ed. 1967); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Note,
The Pure Theory as Ideal Type: Defending Kelsen on the Basis of Weberian Methodology,
105 YALE L.J. 1383, 1393 (1996).
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system characteristics of its extra-legal explanation. This is the reason
many come to the conclusion that sovereignty must be undivided and
unlimited. John Austin, the nineteenth-century philosopher of law,
will be my primary example of this third mistake concerning legal
revolutions.

A. Austin's Command Theory of Law
In some respects Austin's philosophy of law looks very much like
Hart's. Austin identifies a legal system extra-legally through a
sovereign, understood as the person (or group of people) whose
commands are habitually obeyed by the bulk of the population and
who habitually obeys no one else. 86 Where Hart looks for official
practices, Austin looks for popular habits of obedience. The two also
share a similar understanding of legal discontinuity. For Hart,
discontinuity occurs when the rule of recognition changes. 87 For
Austin, it occurs when the bulk of a society changes its habits of
obedience. 88
There is an important difference between Hart's approach and
Austin's however. Although for Austin the sovereign plays an extralegal role in explaining the existence of a legal system, it is also the
supreme lawmaker within the legal system it explains.89 Once there is
a habit of obedience, the person to whom that obedience is given has
supreme authority to make all law.
For Hart, in contrast, the extra-legal explanation of a legal
system is not required to play any particular legal role within the
system. The participants in the rule of recognition are like Austinian

86. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 193-94 (1954)
(1832).
87. See supra note 64.
88. The following is Austin's account of Mexico's independence from Spain, formally
recognized on September 27, 1821 in the Treaty of Cordoba:
When did the revolted colony, which is now the Mexican nation, ascend from the
condition of an insurgent province to that of an independent community? When
did the body of colonists, who affected sovereignty in Mexico, change the
character of rebel leaders for that of a supreme government? . . . Now the
questions suggested above are equivalent to this: When had the inhabitants of
Mexico obeyed that body so generally, and when had that general obedience
become so frequent and lasting, that the bulk of the inhabitants of Mexico were
habitually disobedient to Spain, and probably would not resume their discarded
habit of submission?
AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 206.
89. !d. ("Every positive Jaw ... is set, directly or circuitously, by a sovereign person or
body.").
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sovereigns in an extra-legal sense, because they are responsible for
bringing legal systems into being. 90 But they are not Austinian
sovereigns in the sense of having supreme legal authority to make all
laws. Instead, the lawmaking role any person plays in the system is
determined by the axiom the officials bring into being. If they create
a direct democracy, they and the rest of the people in the society will
jointly have supreme lawmaking authority. If they create an absolute
monarchy, one person-who may or may not be one of them-will
have supreme lawmaking authority.
Because Austin's theory of sovereignty straddles the legal and
the extra-legal, extra-legal concerns motivated him to put
inappropriate legal restrictions upon the sovereign. For example,
because the extra-legal explanation of a legal system is responsible for
all laws within the system, including its axiom, Austin treats the
sovereign as if it must command all laws within the system. This
makes it impossible to explain an axiom that transcends and
authorizes a succession of supreme lawmakers. Assume that Rex l's
reign is followed by the reign of Rex II. If all valid laws must be
traced to an individual sovereign, the change of monarchs must be
understood as a revolution. 91 See Figure L.

90. See supra Section II.A.
91. As Hart explains:
Let us now suppose that, after a successful reign, Rex dies leaving a son Rex II
who then starts to issue general orders. The mere fact that there was a general
habit of obedience to Rex I in his lifetime does not by itself even render probable
that Rex II will be habitually obeyed. Hence if we have nothing more to go on
than the fact of obedience to Rex I and the likelihood that he would continue to be
obeyed, we shall not be able to say of Rex Il's first order, as we could have said of
Rex I's last order, that it was given by one who was a sovereign and therefore
law .... Only after we know that his orders have been obeyed for some time shall
we be able to say that a habit of obedience has been established. . . . Till this stage
is reached there will be an interregnum in which no law can be made.
HART, supra note 59, at 53.
Hart makes its sound as if the problem is the empirical one of determining
whether there will be obedience to Rex II simply because there was obedience to Rex l as if Hart's argument would be undermined by a showing that people are in fact quite
likely to obey a son if they had obeyed the father. But let us say that there is such a
showing. It would still follow that there was a revolution when we moved from the reign
of Rex I to Rex II. Rex I's laws are valid by virtue of being Rex I's cqmmands, and Rex
Il's laws are valid by virtue of being Rex Il's commands. The two systems of laws are
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM:
AN
discontinuous.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 34 (2d ed. 1980).
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One might argue that legal continuity can be preserved if Rex I
commanded obedience to Rex II upon his death. There would be
legal continuity because only one sovereign in the Austinian sense
(namely Rex I) exists. See Figure M.
FigureM

One problem with such an approach is explaining how the authority
of a current sovereign could fundamentally depend upon a habit of
obedience to a dead one. 92 But the real problem is far more
fundamental. It is not just that Austin cannot exclude the possibility
of a revolution between the reigns of Rex I and Rex II; he cannot
exclude the possibility of a revolution between each of Rex I's
commands. Because all law has its source in the command of the
sovereign, there is no place for the axiom of the legal system that
92. HART, supra note 59, at 62. A habit of obedience is confirmed by sensitivity to
changes of command. Since the commands of a dead sovereign may not change, it is hard
to see how we can know that there is a habit of obedience at all. Furthermore, in some
cases the identity of the Austinian sovereign would be forgotten. It is odd to be in a habit
of obeying someone unknown.
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authorizes Rex I himself to make law. There is no sense in which
"Rex I's word is law" is itself law. When asked why what Rex I says
is law, the participants in the legal system would apparently have no
answer. If there is no legal rule authorizing Rex I to make law, there
is no reason not to consider each command issued by Rex I as
independent-its own momentary legal system-such that revolution
happens constantly.
To unify all the commands of Rex I into the same legal system,
an authorization of Rex I to make law-an axiom to the legal
system-is needed. This axiom cannot be commanded by a lawmaker
within the system-even the supreme lawmaker. To say that the
axiom cannot emanate from the supreme lawmaker is simply another
way of saying that it cannot be legally justified-it can only be extralegally explained.
Furthermore once it is conceded that Rex I's authority to make
law has an extra-legal explanation in something outside of his own
commands, the possibility opens up of an even more comprehensive
axiom that allows the reigns of Rex I and Rex II to be contained
within the same legal system. See Figure N.
Figure N

B.

Austin on Limited Sovereignty

The confusion of the legal and the extra-legal also stands behind
Austin's arguments that the sovereign must have unlimited
authority. 93 Austin admitted that the sovereign could defer to the

93. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254 ("[T]he power of a sovereign number in its
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opinions of other sovereigns or its own population. 94 Nevertheless, it
was legally unlimited in the sense that it was subject to no law. 95
Austin is correct that the extra-legal explanation of a legal system
is legally unlimited. All law, even the axiom of the system, is
whatever this extra-legal explanation "says" it is. For example,
assume that three federal district court judges decide that the U.S.
Constitution was a mistake. They draft a new constitution in which
legislative authority rests in a new collective body and executive
authority in the majority leader of that body. They then fill the body
with their friends. From that moment forward, these three judges
follow the new constitution, adjudicating cases in accordance with the
laws generated by the new body.
The judges in this example are clearly acting illegally. Assume,
however, that the new constitution catches on. Eventually all judges,
as well as the other participants in the American rule of recognition,
start following it. No one asks for, or feels the need to give, a legal
justification for the new constitution. It is now the axiom of a new
legal system. At this point the three judges, with all the other
participants in the American rule of recognition, are no longer acting
illegally, because they have generated a new rule under which their
actions are legal. The law is, in a sense, whatever they "say" it is.
They appear to have precisely that limitless lawmaking power that
Austin attributes to the sovereign.
But these participants are not the supreme lawmakers within the
system they create. The new body is. Furthermore, precisely because
they have the unlimited ability to generate any legal system at all,
there is no reason they cannot generate one in which the supreme
lawmaker has limited authorization to create law. If the law is
whatever they "say" it is, what reason is there to believe that they
cannot say that the body can make laws only concerning peanuts and
that all non-peanut laws are void? The body would be the supreme
lawmaker in the sense that all valid laws can be traced back to its
commands. But it would be extremely limited in the types of laws it
may enact.
Austin argues that the sovereign's lawmaking power must be
unlimited because any limits would have to be understood as the

collegiate and sovereign capacity, is incapable of legal limitation."). This tradition goes
back at least as far as Thomas Hobbes. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 213-15 (M.
Oakeshott ed., 1946) (1651).
94. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 214.
95. /d. at 254.
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commands of a higher sovereign. 96 To make every sovereign limited,
one would need an infinite chain of sovereigns, each limiting the one
below it, which Austin rightly calls "impossible and absurd. " 97 He
ignores, however, the fact that the source of these limits could be
extra-legal. After all, even if the legal system has an unlimited
sovereign, there will eventually have to be an extra-legal explanation
of who that person is-why one person rather than another is the one
with that power. That a particular person is the unlimited sovereign
could never be justified in terms of the command of a higher
sovereign, on pain of generating an infinite regress. If we must rely
upon the extra-legal to explain unlimited sovereignty, why not rely
upon it to explain the limited variety?
But what happens if the limited sovereign acts in a manner that it
believes is within these limits but others disagree? 98 Is not a
lawmaker needed to resolve the disagreement? And must not this
sovereign be unlimited, since it would have the final say about what
any limitation is? Its limits would be whatever it said they were,
which is to say it has no limits at all.
Although such arguments are common,99 they make unlimited
sovereignty just as impossible as limited sovereignty. Let us assume
that Rex claims to be the unlimited sovereign but other people
disagree, claiming that Roi is. If we need an unlimited sovereign to
resolve the disagreement, unlimited sovereignty is impossible. For
the disagreement is precisely about who this unlimited sovereign is.
Those who appeal to an unlimited sovereign to resolve
disagreement about limitations on sovereignty simply assume that
significant disagreement does not arise concerning that unlimited
sovereign's status. But the same assumption should be available to
the advocate of limited sovereignty. If the acceptance of the limits on
Rex's sovereignty is as strong as the acceptance that he is the
sovereign, then his sovereignty will be limited. Although there will be
no authority to answer disagreements about his limits, the level of
agreement that makes this unproblematic is precisely why his

96. W.J. Rees, The Theory of Sovereignty Restated, 59 MIND 495, 518 {1950) {"All
political theorists have found it logically necessary, therefore, either to deny the existence
of legal duties on the part of the government so as to be able to maintain its legal
sovereignty ... or else to deny its legal sovereignty in order to assert its legal duties .... ").
See AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254.
97. AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 254.
98. See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1430, 1435 {1987).
99. See RAZ, supra note 17, at 30-33.

HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 370 2004-2005

2005]

LEGAL REVOLUTIONS

371

sovereignty is limited. 100
In short, for the axiom of the legal system to be "whatever Rex
says is law, provided it concerns peanuts," it must be the case that
officials will simply accept the axiom without further legal
justification. This acceptance will manifest itself in their treating
Rex's non-peanut "laws" as legal nullities, without referring the
question to Rex or to another lawmaker. These "laws" will be
treated with the same indifference as the "laws" issued by a madman
who claims to be King or by any other illegitimate pretender to the
throne.
The possibility of genuinely limited sovereignty is crucial to
making sense of entrenched (that is, unamendable) provisions within
constitutions. An example of such a provision is Article 79(3) of the
German constitution (or Grundgesetz). 101 Article 79(3) prohibits
amendments changing the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and
20. 102 On the one hand, the limitations in Article 79(3) can be
understood as not limiting the sovereign at all. Instead, they could be
the creation of the unlimited sovereign who commanded the
constitution as a whole, including Article 79(3). This sovereign would
apparently be the representative assemblies of two-thirds of the
German Lander, which ratified the Grundgesetz. 103 If this sovereign
were to choose a new constitution that rejected the principles in
Articles 1 and 20, there would be no revolutionary change of legal
system.
But the extra-legal evidence might show that these limitations
were actually part of the axiom empowering the representative
assemblies of the Lander to create the constitution in the first place.
Article 79(3), rather than being an act of lawmaking by the sovereign,
would instead be the exemplification of the axiomatic status of the
limitation for those reasoning within the legal system. This would be
true if any constitution enacted by the representative assemblies that
violated the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 would have been
treated by officials as void. If the assemblies later enacted a
100. See Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 59-61
(1992).
101. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 6-16,32-33, 35-36.
102. GRUNDGESETZ [GGJ [Constitution], art. 79(3) (F.R.G.). Article 1 protects
human dignity, and Article 20 protects the state order, including democracy and the
separation of powers, as well as the right to resist any person seeking to abolish the
constitutional order. Cf U.S. CONST. art. V (forbidding amendments that prohibit the
importation of slaves until 1808 or that deprive a state of equal suffrage in the Senate
without its consent).
103. GRUNDGESETZ [GGJ [Constitution], art. 144 (F.R.G.).
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constitution violating the principles and the constitution was accepted
as law, a revolution would have occurred.
C.

Austin (and A mar) on Divided Sovereignty

Austin's confusion of the legal and the extra-legal also stands
behind his demand that the sovereign be undivided. Although he
admitted that some sovereigns, such as the King-in-Parliament, are
composite,104 he insisted that even a composite sovereign was
nevertheless unitary-the composite, acting together, was sole
determiner of the law. 105 Chains of legal validity, Austin argued, must
always lead to a single lawmaker. 106 It cannot be the case that one
lawmaker has final say about one area of the law and another has
final say about another area. 107
Once again, the primary argument against divided sovereignty is
that disagreements about the division of lawmaking powers could
arise. 108 These disagreements, it is assumed, would have to be
answered by a unitary sovereign. But that unitary sovereign could
have this status only on the assumption that there are no serious
disagreements about its lawmaking power. By the same token,
divided sovereignty should be able to exist, provided that there are no
serious disagreements about the divisions of lawmaking power. 109
Indeed, one must believe in the possibility of divided sovereignty
to the extent that one believes that a succession of lawmakers is
possible within the same legal system. This is sovereignty divided
over time. Rex II is able to become King after Rex I (without
revolution) only because there is no serious disagreement about the
temporal division of authority within the system. While Rex I is King,
officials do not accept Rex II's commands as law. When Rex II
becomes King, officials do not accept Rex I's old commands as law
(for example when they conflict with Rex Il's commands).
The same thing should be possible concerning division of
supreme lawmaking authority at the same moment in time. Assume
104. He even went so far as to argue that the sovereign of the United States was an
aggregate body consisting of the joint action of the bodies of each of the states' citizens.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 209 (Wilfried E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995).
105. ld. at 205.
106. ld.
107. ld. ("(U]nless the sovereign be one individual, or one body of individuals, the
given independent society is either in a state of nature, or is split into two or more
independent political societies.").
108. See RAZ, supra note 17, at 35-38.
109. See Pogge, supra note 100, at 59-61.
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that Blue Rex is the supreme lawmaker about issues having only a
domestic element, and Red Rex is the supreme lawmaker about
issues having an international element. Neither Blue Rex nor Red
Rex may overrule the decision of the other.
Provided that
disagreements about the division of authority between Blue Rex and
Red Rex concerning subject matter are as rare as disagreements
about the temporal division of authority between Rex I and Rex II,
then the former division of sovereignty is as real as the latter.
Disagreement may be more likely concerning sovereignty divided
by subject matter than it is concerning sovereignty divided over time.
But saying that divided (or limited) sovereignty is difficult to sustain
is a far cry from saying it is impossible. Furthermore, we can only
determine the extent to which this form of sovereignty exists by
examining legal systems in an unbiased fashion. That someone has
yet to find examples of divided or limited sovereignty means nothing
if she has examined legal systems with the a priori belief that they are
impossible.
The belief that divided and limited sovereignty are impossible is
the result of the confusion of the legal and the extra-legal. In any
legal system, an unlimited and undivided source of law remains in the
background-namely the extra-legal explanation of the legal system
itself. The officials who practice the rule of recognition that brings
the system into being will be unlimited, in the sense that they can
generate any axiom they want. They will also be undivided, in the
sense that only they, acting together in a practice, can create the
system. If their practice is divided, there will be two legal systems.
This does not mean, however, that some unlimited and undivided
sovereign must exist within the system they create.
Amar shares Austin's view that sovereignty must be undivided. 110
Ratification of the Constitution, he argues, could not generate a legal
system in which sovereignty was shared between the states and the
federal government. 111 Either the peoples of the states retained their
pre-ratification sovereignty and each state people can unilaterally
secede simply by choosing to make the Constitution void in their legal
system or the people of the United States became sovereign and all
110. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506 (endorsing Founder James Wilson's
view that sovereignty is absolute and indivisible). Amar also argues that the FoundersMadison excepted-rejected divided sovereignty. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at
1063 (citing Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435 n.40, 1452 n.113) (discussing
Founders' almost universal rejection of dual sovereignty).
111. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15,
at 1062-Q3; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1465-Q6.
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power that the states possess is delegated from this unitary people. 112
But there is no reason to believe that in the United States
sovereignty is not shared with the states, in the sense that state
governments (or their peoples) are the supreme sources of law in
some areas. All that is needed is extra-legal evidence of an accepted
division of lawmaking authority that is not itself justified by reference
to a higher authority. If state authority to make law is granted by
federal law, then Amar would be right that there is only one federal
sovereign. But these two bodies of law can have independent and
coexisting sources. 113
If sovereignty is divided, the states would have no legal power to
unilaterally secede from the Union simply by declaring the
Constitution void. If they could secede at all, it would be only with
the consent of the federal sovereign. But because the states are also
sovereign with respect to state law, the federal sovereign would not
be the only final determiner of valid law.
IV. FOURTH MISTAKE: INCORPORATING POLITICAL SELF-IMAGE
INTO LEGAL AXIOMS
In this Article, I have assumed that Article VII is the axiom of
the American legal system. In fact, since sovereignty may be divided,
Article VII would probably be only part of that axiom. State laws
within our legal system would have their source in different
sovereigns, which would have to be mentioned in any complete
articulation of the axiom of our legal system. But for the rest of this
Article, we can ignore this wrinkle.
If Article VII is the axiom of our legal system, the sovereign
within our system is the conventions of the thirteen original states (or,
perhaps, their peoples). This entity had the ultimate lawmaking

112. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 457, 506; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36,
at 1465-66; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062-{:;3.
113. Cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. . . . The resulting Constitution
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it" and are governed by it.") ; New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (" 'The Constitution ... leaves to the several States
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty . .. reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth
Amendment.'") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). Of
course, if there is indeed divided sovereignty in the United States, it . cannot be legally
justified, either by reference to the Constitution (for example, the Tenth Amendment) or
Supreme Court decisions, without undermining that division of sovereignty itself. The
previous citations must be understood as extra-legal evidence only.
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power, through ratification by at least nine of its constituents, to enact
the Constitution as valid law for the ratifying statesY 4 All valid law
can be traced back to this decision by the sovereign. Had it decided
not to ratify, everything we currently take to be the law of the United
States would be invalid.
But, as we shall see, this conception of our sovereign fits poorly
with popular view that in the United States the people are sovereign.
This is true even if we assume that the conventions of the original
thirteen states expressed the majority wills of the peoples of those
states. The tension between the structure of our legal system and our
political self-image can lead to our fourth mistake concerning legal
revolutions, in which the axiom of a legal system is distorted to
accommodate this self-image. My example of this mistake is, once
again, the writings of Akhil Amar. In Amar's case, the fourth
mistake causes him to see legal continuity where there is actually
revolution.
A.

In the United States, the People Are Not Sovereign

The Article VII sovereign diverges from our political self-image
in at least four respects. First of all, even if it is admitted that
sovereignty may be limited, a popular sovereign is usually understood
as having at least significant discretion concerning the content of laws
that it may enact. In contrast, the Article VII sovereign has no choice
about the content of the law it may enact, since its content is fully
specified in the axiom of the legal system. The sovereign's only
lawmaking power is enacting or refusing to enact a particular
constitution. 115
Second, a popular sovereign is usually understood as having the
power to rescind any laws that it has enacted. 116 In contrast, the
Article VII sovereign's decision is eternal and irrevocable. If the
constitution is enacted, it will be the Constitution forever. No new
constitution can be created to replace it, because Article VII makes
no provisions for such a replacement, even by the Article VII
sovereign itself. 117 The only legal means of constitutional change is
through the Article V amendment procedures identified within the
eternal constitution. If a truly new constitution came into being, it
114. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
115. See Greenawalt, supra note 68, at 639-40 (arguing that the fact that Article VII is
tied to a particular constitution makes it unlikely as an identification of the sovereign).
116. See id. (arguing that the "one time only" character of Article VII makes it unlikely
as the identification of the sovereign).
117. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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could only be the result of a revolution.
One might think that there can be no eternal constitution if
everything that the Article VII sovereign enacted can be amended
away through Article V procedures. Indeed, for just this reason, it
seems that the true sovereign within our legal system is the lawmaker
identified in Article V, since it is that lawmaker that has the final say
about what is or is not in the Constitution.U 8
But the Article V amendment process does not mean that there
is no eternal constitution. This is easiest to see if one assumes that
Article V cannot amend itself, that is, that Article V procedures
cannot be used to change the procedures for amending the
Constitution. 119 If so, the eternal constitution must include at least
Article V itself. The decision of the Article VII lawmaker to enact
Article V put an eternal limit on subsequent participants in the
American legal system. No constitutional change is possible except
through Article V procedures, no matter what the Article V
lawmaker itself says. Furthermore, Article V cannot be changed even
by the Article VII sovereign. If the conventions of the thirteen
original states (or indeed all fifty states) subsequently voted to amend
Article V, this could be considered valid only on the assumption that
a revolution had occurred. The amendment could not be validated by
reference to Article V since Article V may not amend itself. And it
could not be validated by reference to Article VII, for that allows the
state conventions to enact only the Constitution (in which Article V
occurs).
But even if one assumes that self-amendment of Article V is
possible, an eternal core would still remain. Granted, Article V
would not be that eternal core. If Article V procedures were used to
amend Article V, any subsequent amendment of the Constitution
would proceed through the amended, not the original, Article V
procedures. And the amended Article V would not be eternal either.
If this amended Article V were itself amended, then any subsequent
amendment of the Constitution would have to proceed through the
twice-amended Article V procedures. But the fact remains that
however many amendments of the amendment procedures occur, any
amendment of the Constitution, including of the amendment
procedures themselves, is valid only if the procedures by which the

118. See AUSTIN, supra note 86, at 204-05. Cf Alf Ross, On Self-Reference and a
Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1, 3-7 {1969) {arguing that the highest authority in
a legal system is the body with the power to amend the constitution).
119. See infra Sections V.A-B.
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amendment was effectuated can be traced back through a series of
path-dependently valid amendments that ultimately begins with the
original Article V procedures. This is a requirement in the legal
system that no lawmaker can change, including the Article VII
sovereign. It is the eternal constitution that can be altered only
through revolution.
In contrast to Article VII, the American axiom as Amar
understands it gives the sovereign of our system the discretion to
create any constitution it wishes, and to rescind a constitution at
will. 12° For Amar, the people of the United States, through a simple
vote, can create a constitution that is utterly different from our
current one. 121 There is no eternal constitution within our system. To
be sure, the axiom of the system is eternal. As long as we remain in
the American legal system as Amar understands it, the people will be
sovereign. 122 This is something over which, as we shall see in Part V,
even the people have no legal control. But the Article VII sovereign
was not merely unable to change the axiom of its legal system. In
addition, the axiom gave it no choice about the constitution that it
could create. And Amar's sovereign is not restricted in this fashion. 123
A third divergence from our political self-image is that a popular
sovereign is usually· understood as being alive, whereas the Article
VII sovereign is dead. The conventions of the states referred to in
Article VII are the conventions at the time of the ratification, not any
conventions that might subsequently be created. Of course, this is not
surprising, since the sole lawmaking decision entrusted to that
sovereign has already been made and is irrevocable.
Once again, Amar's approach is more in keeping with our
political self-image. The living people of the United States are the
ultimate source of valid law. 124 It is precisely for this reason that
Amar insists that Article V cannot be the sole method of
constitutional change. 125 This would be incompatible with the
sovereignty of the living, since Article V's restrictions can keep an
amendment from being enacted even if the majority of those living in
the United States-or, indeed, the majority of those living in a

120. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1044-45.
121. /d.
122. See infra Section V.C.
123. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1434-35 (arguing that American sovereign is
unlimited).
124. /d. at 1072.
125. /d. at1054-57, 1063.
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particular state-wanted it. 126 No living people would have ultimate
control over the law that binds them.
Furthermore, popular sovereignty is commonly understood as
encompassing all the people. But if Article VII is the axiom of our
legal system, the conventions (or peoples) of the thirty-seven nonratifying states are not constituents of this sovereign. Although
American laws are valid within New Hampshire in a way that can be
traced back ultimately to a decision of the people of New Hampshire
(albeit the dead people of that state), American laws are valid in, say,
Hawaii in a way that cannot be traced back to a decision of the people
of Hawaii, living or dead. Although Hawaii voted to become a state
in 1959, as a condition for statehood under the Hawaii Admission
Act, 127 all that is required for the admission of a state under Article
IV, section 3 is congressional consent-not the consent of the new
state itself. 128 And since the requirements of Article IV, section 3
derive ultimately from the conventions of the original thirteen states,
the constitutional rights and obligations of Hawaiians derive from the
choices made by foreigners.
In any event, refusing statehood would not have removed Hawaii
from the American legal system as long as it remained a territory. 129
And Hawaii was made a territory of the United States without the
consent of the people of Hawaii. American annexation in 1898 was
negotiated with the consent of the Republic of Hawaii, 130 an oligarchy
of pro-annexationist Americans that had overthrown the Hawaiian

126. !d. at 1062-63.
127. See An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union,
Pub. L. 86-3, § 7, 73 Stat. 4, 7 (1959). In addition, the Territorial Legislature petitioned
Congress for statehood in 1903 and Hawaii voted to join the union by plebiscite in 1940.
RICH BUDNICK, STOLEN KINGDOM: AN AMERICAN CONSPIRACY 188-90 (Aloha Press
1992). Hawaii's admission, like the admission of other states, was in accordance with the
congressional practice, which may also be constitutionally required , of admitting states on
an "equal footing" with the original thirteen colonies. See State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370, 373 (1977) (quoting Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867)); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 563-69, 576-77, 579 (1911);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224 (1845). The equal footing doctrine is
a misnomer, however. The admitted states are not given the option, which was given to
the original states, of refusing obligations under American law entirely. See infra notes
128-39 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 3.
129. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, David Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 , 54243 (1828).
130. See Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United
States, 30 Stat. 750, 55 Pub. Res. 55 (July 7, 1898). Consent was through the Senate of
Hawaii.
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Kingdom under Queen Lili'uokalani, by force, in 1893. 131
Since Hawaii was an independent nation with diplomatic
relations, including relations with the United States, prior to
annexation, it is a particularly vivid example. 132 But it is not at all
exceptional. The same could be said of the people of any of the other
thirty-six non-ratifying states. The Louisiana Purchase, for example,
did not involve the consent of those people, even those white people,
who became subject to American laws as a result of the purchase. 133
As John Quincy Adams rightly put it, the Louisiana Treaty created
"despotic powers over the territories purchased." 134
It is true that Article V procedures give the people of Hawaii or
Missouri the ability to participate in constitutional change. But it
cannot put them on an equal footing with people of the thirteen
original states, since Article V does not give the people of Hawaii or
Missouri a unilateral right to block amendments to the Constitution.
Under Article VII, the dead people of New Hampshire had the
option of avoiding obligations under the Constitution (such as their
obligations under the Commerce Clause) by refusing to ratify the
Constitution. In contrast, the people of Hawaii or Missouri can avoid
their obligations under the Commerce Clause only if they can first
convince the legislatures or conventions of thirty-seven other states to
repeal it.
The tension between our political self-image and the sovereignty
of the Article VII lawmaker makes it tempting to argue that the
axiom of our legal system must be something other than Article VII,
that legal justifications must end with a higher legal principle that
gives the ultimate choice of legal validity to the people who currently

131. Jennifer M.L. Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal
Analysis of the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawai'i's Annexation, and
Possible Reparations, 17 U. HAW. L. REV. 463, 465-{56 (1995); Lisa Cami Oshiro,
Comment, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV.
65, 70-74 (1995).
132. See Chock, supra note 131, at 463-64; Oshiro, supra note 131, at 66-70.
133. See Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, 8 Stat. 200, TS 86 (Apr. 30, 1803) (not
conditioning the agreement on the consent of any of the citizens of the territory).
134. 5 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 401 (Charles Francis Adams ed., AMS
Press 1970) (1874-1877). The primary worry about the constitutionality of the Louisiana
Purchase, however, did not have to do with the absence of consent of the inhabitants of
the territories themselves, but the fact that national government could affect the interests
of the current states, especially by generating new states, without the current states'
consent. Jefferson and Adams both worried that a constitutional amendment might be
necessary to make the purchase legitimate. See Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces
and the Empire of Liberty: States' Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV.
343, 346 (2003).
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live in the entire United States. But this temptation should be
resisted. By giving in to it, we will lose sight of the legal system we
currently inhabit. This is the fourth mistake concerning legal
revolutions.

B.

Amar Forces Us To Be Free

Amar's account of the American sovereign is an example of this
mistake. 135 The sovereignty of the dead, he argues, is contrary to our
democratic traditionsY 6 The living must rule. This motivates him to
look behind the lawmakers identified in Article VII for an enduring
sovereign-the people of the United States. 137
Because this
sovereign, unlike that identified in Article VII, is alive, it can bypass
Article V procedures for amendment, without a revolutionary break
in legal continuity, simply by creating a new constitution. 138
But Amar is not uncovering the structure of our legal system.
We do not currently inhabit a system in which the ultimate source of
legal validity is the people of the United States. The evidence for this
is the fact that Amar's argument that the Constitution can be
amended through a simple majority vote was greeted, and is still
greeted, with an extreme skepticism that Amar himself
acknowledges. 139
Amar's response to the skeptics is that they "suffer from
remarkable amnesia concerning the Constitution's words and
deeds. " 140 The forgotten history of the Founding shows that the
people are sovereign. But how can the views of people two centuries
ago determine what legal system we currently inhabit? Even if Amar
had succeeded in showing that the people were accepted as sovereign
during the Founding, that does not mean that we currently inhabit
such a legal system. All Amar would have done is show is that we
135. Cf. David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 30-35 (1990) (arguing that Amar's popular vote theory is
not based on the constitution but is rather an esoteric notion and is irrelevant to
constitutional interpretation); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165-76 (1996)
(arguing that constitutional amendment by a simple majority was not what the Framers
intended and that it would be a "bad" development).
136. Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1072-75.
137. See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1427.
138. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1044.
139. See DAVID R. DOW, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 117,
123-24, 136-42 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Dow, supra note 135; Charles Fried,
Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13,29-33 (1995); Monaghan, supra note 135.
140. Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 497.
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have undergone a revolution since that time. The ultimate standard
of legal validity used to be the people of the United States. In the
past, circumvention of Article V by a popular vote would have been
viewed as non-revolutionary. Now, due to the very amnesia that
Amar identifies, the ultimate standard of legal validity is the dead
peoples of the thirteen original states.
Indeed, there is an irony to Amar's appeal to history. On the
one hand, by making the enduring people sovereign, Amar seeks to
"cast[ ] off the dead hand of the past." 141 If decisions made by the
dead could legally bind us-we would lose our democratic
credentials. But by freeing us from the sovereignty of the past as a
legal matter, Amar has bound us to the past extra-legally. Why are we
in a legal system in which we are free of the sovereignty of the past?
Because of views that people had over two centuries ago. It does not
matter, Amar argues, that we refuse to recognize ourselves as
sovereign. 142 The dead hand of the past makes us so.
Amar's appeal to the past is also selective. If he is allowed to
ignore our current beliefs when determining what legal system we
inhabit, why is he so willing to look to the beliefs the Founders had
when determining what legal system they inhabited? Why not worry
about whether they suffered from "remarkable amnesia" concerning
the ultimate sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament?
Amar is an example of why the distortion of our legal system to
fit our political self-image should be resisted. If we succumb to the
temptation to view our legal system in the light of our political ideals,
all that will happen is that our view of our own legal system will be
obscured. We will begin treating as law positions that are not in fact
valid within our legal system. We will see legal continuity where
there is actually revolution.
It is worth noting that there is another very different reason that
Amar might believe that the people of the United States are
sovereign. He might think that the existence of a rule of recognition
depends, not upon officialdom (as Hart does 143 ), but upon the
population as a whole. If so, then, in a sense, the law would be
whatever the people "say" it is, just as for Hart the law is whatever
officialdom "says" it is.

141. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1072.
142. See Fried, supra note 139, at 31; Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability:
Responses to Responding to Imperfection, 74 TEX. L. REV. 839, 853-57 (1996).
143. See supra Section II.A.
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But, as we have seen/ 44 identifying the community at the basis of
the rule of recognition is very different from identifying the sovereign
within the legal system created by thatrule of recognition. Assume
that it was the French people-not French officials-who generated
the rule of recognition in which Louis XVI's word was law. It would
not follow that France before the Revolution was really a democracy
or that the French Revolution, far from being revolutionary, merely
involved the people of France changing the body to whom they
delegated their power from Louis to the National Assembly.
If the people are the community standing behind the rule of
recognition, then the sovereign is whatever the people accept, without
justification, as the ultimate lawmaker. If they accept Louis, then
they have generated an absolute monarchy.
If they accept
themselves, then they have generated a democracy. Accordingly one
does not know who the sovereign in our system is simply by being
told that the people are the community establishing our rule of
recognition. And one does not know that there is legal continuity
simply by being told that there is continuity to this community.
V. FIFTH MISTAKE: SELF-AUTHORIZATION AND SELF-LIMITATION
OF AUTHORITY

I have argued that legal systems are identified by axioms that are
not themselves legally justified. If the axiom of the American legal
system is Article VII, then the Constitutional Convention was not an
authorized lawmaking body when it created Article VII. But why not
say that Article VII authorized itself, because it was ratified according
to its own procedures? After all, Article VII is, at least formally, part
of the Constitution, and the Constitution was ratified by the
conventions of at least nine states. 145 See Figure 0.

144. See supra Section II.A-B.
145. Joseph Raz argues that laws may, through a loop, indirectly authorize their own
creation, but he admits that the validity of the laws within the loop "can be proved only if,
in the last resort, the validity of one of the laws is assumed and not proved." RAZ, supra
note 17, at 139.
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Figure 0

A good deal rides on this question, because if a sovereign could
authorize the very axiom that gives it authority, then it should also be
able to refuse to authorize it or refuse to authorize it fully, thereby
terminating or limiting its authority. And if that is possible, then
revolutions may be far less common than has been supposed.
Consider Louis XVI's relationship to the National Assembly in
August of 1789. At that time the King was a limited monarch, in the
sense that he could not revoke the National Assembly's lawmaking
power. We treated this as a reason to conclude that a revolution had
occurred. The sovereignty of the King was replaced, through extralegal means, by the sovereignty of the National Assembly. But if the
King could have used his absolute authority to irrevocably delegate
his authority to the National Assembly, then a revolution may not
have occurred after all.
Indeed, there may be no reason to conclude that the American
Revolution really occurred. It is true that, at one point, valid laws
were traceable back to the King-in-Parliament146 and, at another
point, the colonies were "Free and Independent States" with the "full
146. The sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament was challenged from the American
perspective before the Revolution. See, e.g., JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND
CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 66-68 (1986) (describing
Benjamin Franklin's questioning of the authority of Parliament over the colonies).
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Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may of right do." 147 But in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Great
Britain recognized the thirteen colonies as "free, sovereign and
independent States. " 148 Of course, Americans are disinclined to
understand their laws as valid only because of the Treaty of Paris.
But maybe this is because of the worry that if American laws had
such a source, they could be revoked by the King-in-Parliament. And
once we realize that the King-in-Parliament could have irrevocably
delegated its absolute authority, we might be less inclined to think
that the American Revolution happened after all.
A.

Self-limitation as Revolution

In order to determine the possibility of a sovereign legally
changing the very axiom that gives it authority, it is crucial to
distinguish such an event from revolution. Although Louis XVI's
recognition of the Declaration of the Rights of Man might be
understood as legally validating the Declaration, it can also be
understood as the simple acknowledgement that a revolution had
occurred. Indeed, even if one assumed that the Declaration was not
valid until after the King's recognition, it does not yet follow that
Louis XVI was legally responsible for the Declaration's validity. The
King's utterance of the words "I recognize the Declaration" could
have motivated officials, who formerly looked to the King as the
ultimate source of law, to look to the National Assembly. This
utterance would have been no different from any of the other ways
that the King could cause a change in rules of recognition, for
example, by vigorously picking his nose in public. Observing his
nose-picking, officials might lose so much respect for Louis that they
begin looking to the National Assembly as the ultimate lawmaker.
But that would not mean that the King legally self-limited his
authority by picking his nose.
For Louis to have limited his authority in a non-revolutionary
fashion, the pre- and post-recognition legal systems must have been
the same. But that makes it hard to see how the King's recognition
could possibly have bound him. If officials retained the practice of
looking to the King as the ultimate source of law, they would have
followed his command if he revoked the Declaration and with it the
147. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 35 (U.S. 1776).
148. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. I, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 80, 81
(known as the "Treaty of Paris.").
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National Assembly's power. France would have remained an
absolute monarchy. 149
We appear to be driven to the position that Louis's recognition,
and all other acts of self-limitation of authority, must be either
revocable or revolutionary. There is a problem with this conclusion
however. Consider amendment provisions within constitutions, such
as Article V. Since these provisions create lawmaking authorities,
their self-amendment (for example, the use of Article V procedures
to amend Article V itself) would appear to be the self-limitation of
authority. And if the amended rather than the original amendment
procedures must be used to rescind the self-amendment, this selflimitation would be binding-something we have concluded is
revolutionary. 150 The revolution would be no less real because the
self-limitation was accomplished by a subsidiary authority within the
legal system.
That binding self-amendment of amendment clauses must be
understood as revolutionary would not be a problem in itself if it were
rare. But amendment provisions (although not Article V itself151 ) are
commonly amended by their own procedures in a way that is taken to
be binding and non-revolutionary. 152
149. Ross, supra note 118, at 6.
150. /d. Ross used as his example the Article 88 of the Danish Constitution.
151. But even with Article V, there have been attempts. See PETER SUBER, THE
PARADOX OF SELF AMENDMENT, Appendix I (1990). In only one case was the selfamendment actually passed by two-thirds of each house of Congress, qualifying it to be
submitted to the states. This was the Corwin Amendment, which, in a last-minute attempt
to avert the Civil War, would have forbad amendments to the Constitution that would
authorize or empower Congress to interfere with slavery. See A. Christopher Bryant,
Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and "Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment, 26 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 501, 512-540 (2003). The Corwin amendment was not, however, passed by
the requisite three-fourths of the states. It is unclear whether the Corwin Amendment
would have been genuinely irrevocable, in the sense that it could never be repealed. !d. at
534-40. But it certainly looked like it would have bindingly amended Article V, in the
sense that post-Corwin procedures for amendment would have had to be used to get rid of
it. For example, an act of Congress proposing an amendment repealing the Corwin
Amendment would probably be considered interference with slavery and so forbidden.
Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 730
(1981). The Corwin amendment could have been repealed only by calling a convention
upon the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, since that is the only
method under Article V that would not involve congressional action.
152. See SUBER, supra note 151, Appendix II. The amendment clauses of 35 state
constitutions have been amended by their own procedures: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West
Virginia.
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Self-limitation Within Authority

Is there is a way of avoiding the conclusion that revolutions are
ubiquitous, while still rejecting the possibility of an authorized
lawmaker using his lawmaking power to change the content of his
own authorization? Let us begin by considering a non-legal case
concerning a subsidiary authority. Imagine that I authorize you to
make rules for my child in my absence. While I am gone, you attempt
to delegate your rulemaking power to someone else, in a way that
cannot be rescinded, because you feel that this is in the best interest
of my child. (Perhaps you feel a bout of temporary dementia coming
on.) Do we have to conclude that your delegation was unsuccessful,
because it remained rescindable, or that a revolution occurred,
because you acted outside of my authorization?
Is it not possible that your delegation was within my
authorization? Perhaps I did not merely authorized you, but also
anyone to whom you delegated your power, in a way that could not
be rescinded by you. If I did, your delegation would be binding and
non-revolutionary. But such delegation would not be an example of
self-limitation of authority. To have self-limited your authority, you
must have used the authority I gave you to change the authority that I
gave you. For example, although I gave you the authority to only
revocably delegate, you somehow used this authority to make it such
that you could irrevocably delegate. When self-limitation of authority
is understood in this fashion however, it is not surprising that it would
have to be either unsuccessful or revolutionary.
There are many ways that one can be authorized to self-limit
one's rulemaking powers. For this reason, it is virtually impossible to
specify in the language of an authorization all the forms of selflimitation that are authorized or forbidden. Assume that I say: "I
authorize you to make rules for my child in my absence." Taken
literally, this language suggests that you are forbidden to delegate
your rulemaking power in any way, even revocably. You alone, not
anyone else, have the power to make rules for my child. To the
extent that you can delegate, my authorization must have really been
something like the following: "I authorize you to make rules for my
child in my absence with the following exception: if you should
delegate your powers to another rulemaker, the rules for my child will
henceforth be whatever the delegated rulemaker says they are and
not whatever you say they are."
In short, we must look behind the language of an authorization to
answer the question of whether self-limitation of rulemaking power is
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authorized.
Sometimes, of course, the question will not be
answerable. But even in these unclear cases the fact that successful
self-limitation takes place is not evidence that the authorized party
used her authority to limit her authority. They are merely cases
where we are unclear whether a revolution or authorized selflimitation has occurred. 153
We can now apply this lesson to the self-limitation of power by
subsidiary lawmakers.
This should be distinguished from the
lawmaker's power changing because of a change in the authorization
he received from a higher-order lawmaker. For example, if Amar is
right that the people are sovereign and that the lawmaker identified
in Article V possesses authority only because the people say so,
Article V can change (or be set aside entirely) as a result of a national
vote. This is not a case of the lawmaker identified in Article V selflimiting its power however. For that to occur, the procedures in
Article V themselves must be used to amend Article V.
The question of whether self-amendment of Article V is possible
amounts to the question of whether the lawmaker responsible for
Article V (which we are assuming is specified in Article VII)
authorized the lawmaker identified in Article V to self-limit its
power. This question cannot be answered by looking to the language
of Article V itself. Taken literally, Article V forbids self-limitation,
since it says only that the conventions or legislatures of three-quarters
of the states can amend, not that some other body can amend if the
conventions or legislatures of three-quarters of the states delegate
their lawmaking power to that body. But powers of irrevocable
delegation are tacit in many authorizations. It is for precisely this
reason that amendment provisions in state constitutions are
commonly amended, without the feeling that a revolution has

153. My argument here relies in large part upon Alf Ross's solution to the puzzle of
self-amendment. Ross, supra note 118, at 24. For arguments that there is no puzzle at all,
see H.L.A. Hart, Self-Referring Laws, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
170 (1983); Norbert Hoerster, On Alf Ross's Alleged Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 81
MIND 422 (1962); Joseph Raz, Professor A. Ross and Some Legal Puzzles, 81 MIND 415
(1962). For an argument that the puzzle can resist these criticisms, see SUBER, supra note
151, §§ 5-10. Suber argues the puzzle is unsolvable, but he seriously misunderstands
Ross's solution, describing the axiom that allows self-limitation of power as a
"transcendent, immutable rule, universal across all systems." /d. § 6.B. The rule is not
transcendent, in the sense of being beyond empirical confirmation, for, like any axiom, it
can be extra-legally explained. It is an extra-legal question whether such an axiom exists
or not. It is also not immutable, for it can be changed by revolution. Finally, it is not
universal across legal systems, for some legal systems may allow self-limitation of power,
while others may not.

HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 387 2004-2005

388

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

occurred. 154 There is no reason to think that Article V is any
different. Nevertheless, the fact remains that if Article V can be
amended, that will mean only that the body identified in Article V
was authorized to self-limit its power, not that it changed its very
authorization.
Finally, we can consider the question of whether the supreme
lawmaker within a legal system may self-limit its lawmaking power. 155
Here too the question should be answered by reference to the scope
of the relevant authorization, that is, the axiom of the legal system.
And however one answers this question, the supreme lawmaker will
be powerless to use his authority to change the axiom itself. If it is
authorized to self-limit its power, it may do so, without revolution.
But it may never legally change the scope of its authority. A change
in the scope of its authority is possible only through revolution.
Some binding self-limitation of power is generally within the
authorization of all supreme lawmakers. For this reason the axiom of
even the simplest legal system must be fairly complex. If "the law is
whatever Louis XVI says it is" were the axiom of the French legal
system in 1788, Louis would not merely have been unable to
irrevocably delegate his lawmaking power-he would have had no
ability to revocably delegate it. Indeed, he would have had no ability
to name a successor, to abdicate, or to transfer his lawmaking
authority upon his death. He, and, only he, would be the lawmaker of
France. When he died, he would remain the sole lawmaker. There
would be a sovereign but no laws. New laws would be able to come
into being only through a revolutionary change of legal systems.
Since Louis XVI must have had some authority to self-limit his
lawmaking powers, it is not inconceivable that he could have had the
ability to irrevocably recognize the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the power of the National Assembly in 1789. This bare
possibility does not mean, of course, that the French Revolution
never occurred. First of all, the axiom of the French legal system
probably did not allow Louis to irrevocably delegate his lawmaking
powers to someone other than a royal successor. But even if it did,

154. SUBER, supra note 151, Appendix II.
155. Ross in fact, confines himself to self-limitation of supreme authority. Ross, supra
note 118, at 21-24. In other words, he rejects the possibility that the lawmaker identified
in the axiom of the legal system can change its own authority. /d. But the examples he
gives of these axioms are amendment provisions, such as Article 88 of the Danish
Constitution and Article V of the United States Constitution. /d. passim. It is
questionable that these are in fact the axioms, or part of the axioms, of the relevant legal
systems. Article V, for example, was passed in accordance with Article VII.
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the fact that the valid laws of the National Assembly could be
justified by reference to the 1788 axiom does not mean that they were.
The post-recognition axiom surely pointed solely to the National
Assembly or the people of France. The justification of valid laws
stopped at these bodies. It did not appeal further to Louis's act of
irrevocable recognition. 156
Although a sovereign can be authorized to limit its lawmaking
power, it cannot legally change its authority, because its authority
depends upon an extra-legal source over which it has no legal control.
And because self-limitation of authority is impossible, selfThe very act of
authorization must be impossible as well.
authorization presupposes that the extra-legal explanation is in place,
which makes self-authorization both unnecessary and ineffective.
Either Article VII gave the states authority to create the Constitution
or it did not. If the extra-legal evidence shows that it did, then Article
VII does not need to be authorized by the states. If the evidence
shows that it did not, then Article VII cannot be authorized by the
states because they have no lawmaking power.
C.

Amar on the Inalienability of Authority

Amar appears to agree that the axiom of a legal system cannot
be changed by the sovereign within that system. For example, he
describes the legal right of the American people to choose their
constitutions as "inalienable." 157 This might be understood as the
stronger claim that Americans could not do anything to lose this
ultimate legal right. If they failed to exercise it (and so lapsed into a
dictatorship of acquiescence), they would remain in a legal system in
which they had ultimate lawmaking authority. There would be a
lawmaker-the American people-but no laws.
But it is hard to see how Amar could justify this stronger
position. After all, he admits that extra-legal events were able to
move us from a legal system in which the American people did not
have ultimate lawmaking authority (the British one) to a legal system
in which they did, so why could the same process not work in reverse?
If Amar thought that laws always had to be ultimately justified legally
by reference to the moral principle of popular sovereignty-that is, if
he were a type of natural law theorist-then he could insist that
nothing that Americans could do would lead them to lose their
156. See LEFEBVRE, supra note 1, at 133-35 (arguing that by August of 1789 the
validity of the Declaration of the Rights of Man did not depend upon royal approval).
157. /d. at 464; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1050.
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sovereignty, since Americans do not have the power to invalidate that
moral principle. But, as we have seen, Amar believes that the moral
principle of popular sovereignty became the legal axiom of the
American system only because of certain social facts.
I must conclude that Amar is merely speaking of legal
alienation-an inalienability from within the American legal system.
Indeed, my guess is that he is relying upon precisely the more
comprehensive principle about the structure of legal systems that we
uncovered above: the sovereign in any legal system may not enact a
law that changes the axiom that gives it authority. 158 This applies
across the board. Just as the American people may not use their
supreme lawmaking power to legalize absolute monarchy, Louis XVI
may not use his supreme lawmaking power to legalize democracy.
But events changed France from an absolute monarchy to a
democracy, and they could change the United States from a
democracy to a monarchy. Furthermore, these events can include the
decisions of the American people themselves. Even if the American
people cannot legally revoke their right to choose their constitutions,
they could nevertheless make it such that they entered a legal system
in which they no longer possessed this right.

D. Amar's Exception to the Principle that Authority is Inalienable
But the inalienability of authority makes it difficult for Amar to
explain the ratification of the Constitution. He insists that before
ratification the peoples of the states were unlimited sovereigns. 159 But
after it, unlimited sovereignty rested in the people of the United
States as a whole. 160 The simple explanation is that a revolution
occurred-the ratification was no more legally effective in creating
the American legal system out of the state legal systems than Louis
XVI's recognition of the National Assembly could be in bringing
about democracy. 161 The act of ratification bound the states only
from the perspective of the American legal system. From the
perspective of the state systems, the Constitution was no different
from the Articles of Confederation-it had legal effect only to the
extent that it was recognized within these systems.

158. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 496 n.l54; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note
15, at 1068.
159. See Amar, Consent, supra note 15, at 507; Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at
1062-63; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1435.
160. See Amar, Philadelphia, supra note 15, at 1062-63.
161. Monaghan, supra note 135, at 135.
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Because Amar is unwilling to accept a revolutionary explanation
of the Founding, he carves out an exception to the inalienability of
authority when one sovereign people are generated from a collection
of multiple sovereign peoples:
·
It was by these very acts [of ratification] that previously
separate state Peoples agreed to 'consolidate' themselves into a
single continental People. Before ratification, the People of
each state were indeed sovereign-and for that very reason
could not be bound by the new Constitution if they chose not to
ratify, no matter what any of the other sovereign Peoples chose
to do. Thus, although Article VII required only nine states to
ratify, it confirmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of
each state by proclaiming that the Constitution would go into
effect only between the nine or more states ratifying. The
ratifications themselves thus formed the basic social compact by
which formerly distinct sovereign Peoples, each acting in
convention, agreed to reconstitute themselves into one common
sovereignty.162

In arguing that alienation of unlimited sovereignty is possible, Amar
has succumbed to the fifth mistake concerning legal revolutions.
For Amar the Article VII process legally bridged legal systems.
Although the result of the ratification process was a unified American
sovereign, "the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of each state"
was integral to the process, because no state's people were required
to relinquish their authority without their consent. But the fact that
the state's people could not lose their authority without their consent
hardly confirms their sovereignty. If the state peoples truly were
unlimited sovereigns, as Amar insists, their act of consent could not
bind them at all. As the ultimate determiners of law, they could make
their consent a legal nullity at will. The very idea that they could bind
themselves by their consent must mean that even before they
consented they were participating in a legal system whose valid laws
could not be traced back to their individual will. Although this legal
system gave them a choice about whether they would be obligated
under the Constitution, it did not give them a choice about legal
consequences of their choice.
In short, Article VII could make unilateral secession impossible
after ratification only on the assumption that the state peoples had
already lost their unlimited sovereignty before ratification. Only then
162. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1460 (emphasis in original).

HeinOnline -- 83 N.C. L. Rev. 391 2004-2005

392

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

could the legal consequences of their ratification be beyond their
control. That means that the ratification, far from bridging state and
federal legal systems, had legal effect only from the perspective of the
new federal legal system. For the ratification to occur a revolution
must have already taken place.
Even if Amar understands the state peoples' sovereignty as
unlimited, however, we do not have to ourselves. Their sovereignty
could have been limited in the sense that the irrevocable delegation
of their lawmaking power was allowed under the axioms of their legal
systems. If the officials of the Massachusetts legal system did not look
to the people of Massachusetts as the ultimate standard of legal
validity, but looked to this people until they delegated their power to
another lawmaker (such as the people of the United States), it seems
that the ratification could create an American legal system without
revolution. Amar succumbs to the fifth mistake because of his
commitment to the unlimited nature of sovereignty. This forced him
to conclude that the state peoples were somehow able to legally alter
the very axiom that gave them authority.
Nevertheless, even if Amar had conceded that the state peoples'
authority was already limited under the axioms of the state legal
systems, in the sense that they could irrevocably delegate their
lawmaking power to another more comprehensive people, there is
still a problem with a non-revolutionary explanation of the
ratification. Simply because legal systems share the same sovereign
does not mean that they are the same legal system. They will be
unified only if, as an extra-legal matter, the practices that are the
sources of the systems unite. For example, imagine that soon after
1776, Massachusetts and New Hampshire-feeling expansionist, but
also democratic-each claimed to be the United States. In other
words, the officials in each system looked to the people of the United
States as the sovereign of their system. This situation would not be
sustainable for long, since the absence of any Massachusetts or New
Hampshire officials and institutions in the other states would mean
that there would be no procedures for the sovereign to speak within
the Massachusetts or New Hampshire systems. Nevertheless, while it
lasted, there would be two independent legal systems, each of which
was, as an internal legal matter, the United States, in the sense that the
people of the United States was the sovereign for each system.
Things might not have been much different after the ratification
of the Constitution. Even though from the perspective of the thirteen
state systems the people of the United States would be sovereignthat would be true only from within each of the state systems. It
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would not yet follow that there was a United States, understood as a
unified legal system. There could still have been thirteen (unstable)
legal systems each sharing the same sovereign.
It is true that legal practices are very likely to merge if they claim
the same sovereign. If the participants in thirteen legal practices each
believe they have unified, then they are likely to make that belief
concrete. But the extra-legal fact of unification is the reason for the
unity of the legal systems. Because Amar fails to appreciate this
extra-legal dimension of the ratification, he treats the creation of the
American legal system out of the state systems as if it were a purely
legal matter of the ratification. An extra-legal event, which was not
assured by the ratification, was necessary-the revolutionary
unification of legal systems that gave birth to the United States.
VI. SIXTH MISTAKE: MISIDENTIFYING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
LAWMAKING

A.

Judicial Lawmaking

Up to this point, we have not much considered the role of courts
as lawmaking bodies. It is clear that the axiom of a legal system, or
an authority within that system, may give courts the power to create
common law. 163
But what about lawmaking through judicial
interpretation of law? Courts would have such lawmaking power if
their interpretations of law were taken by officials within the system
as authoritative, in the sense that officials looked to the opinions and
not the law itself when determining what norms should be enforced.
There are two ways that this can occur. On the one hand, the
judgment that the judge issues can be valid-in the sense that other
legal actors must respect the judgment even if the law was
misinterpreted. On the other hand, the interpretation of the law in
the court's written opinion can be valid, in the sense that other legal
actors are bound to respect that interpretation-not their own views
about the uninterpreted law-in future situations.
Few have seriously doubted that interpretations are-and should
be-binding in the first sense. 164 A concrete judgment (for example
providing damages to a plaintiff or acquitting a criminal defendant)
must be respected and enforced by other legal actors, even if they
163. Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV.
263, 279 (1992).
164. The sole example I am aware of is Michael Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 276--84 (1994).
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believe (correctly) that it is based upon a misinterpretation of the
law. 165 On the other hand, whether judicial interpretations of the law
should be binding beyond the particular case adjudicated has been a
matter of more debate. Some have questioned whether federal
courts' interpretation of federal law-and particularly the United
States Constitution-should be binding upon the other branches of
the federal government, or even upon the states. 166
Nevertheless, it certainly seems safe to say that some
interpretations are in fact treated as binding in our legal system,
whether or not they should be.
For example, consider the
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment provided by the Supreme
Court in Hans v. Louisiana. 167 The Eleventh Amendment states that
"[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." 168 This language appears drafted to
end a source of diversity jurisdiction otherwise available in Article
III, namely jurisdiction for "controversies . . . between a State and
So understood, the Eleventh
Citizens of another State." 169
Amendment would not preclude a federal question action brought
against a state in federal court, particularly one brought by a citizen
of that same state. 170 This is the prevailing view of the Eleventh
165. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2001); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 979, 988-89 (1987); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993); MichaelS. Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 82 (1993).
166. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 165; Paulsen, supra note 165. The Supreme Court
declared that its constitutional rulings are binding in this stronger sense in Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
167. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1890).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
169. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 1.
170. The history of the Amendment supports this reading. The Eleventh Amendment
was enacted to abrogate the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793).
See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 71 (1972). Chisholm was a state law action in the United States
Supreme Court brought by the South Carolina executor of the estate of a South Carolina
merchant, Robert Farquhar, to collect revolutionary war debt owed by the State of
Georgia. Chisholm argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the Court had federal
subject matter jurisdiction under diversity. /d. at 425. The language of the Eleventh
Amendment was crafted to end this source of jurisdiction. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 45-46
(1988); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1696 (1997).
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Amendment among legal scholars. 171 And yet the Hans Court read
the Eleventh Amendment as recognizing a more comprehensive
principle of state sovereign immunity in federal courts that applies to
federal question actions, including those between a state and a citizen
of that same state.
It would be a mischaracterization of our legal system, however,
to say that our Eleventh Amendment-the Amendment as it exists in
our current legal system-solely concerns diversity jurisdiction. The
interpretation in Hans "has been folded into the Eleventh
Amendment itself. " 172 Deference to the Supreme Court's reading is
so complete that only legal scholars have views about the original
uninterpreted Eleventh Amendment. What practitioners know is the
Amendment as interpreted by Hans.
Assume that all judicial interpretations of the law are binding in
this sense. This would mean that, rather than understanding the
Commerce Clause as authorizing Congress to make law, we would
have to understand it as authorizing the courts to authorize Congress
to make law through their interpretations of the Commerce Clause.
And Sarbanes-Oxley, in turn, would authorize the courts to authorize
the SEC to make law. Indeed, section 205.3(b)(l) would be
understood, not as a command to attorneys practicing before the
SEC, but as an authorization to the courts to create commands
applying to such attorneys. 173
171. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 170, at 83-97 (noting that Article III extends federal
jurisdiction to all federal question controversies without regard for the character of the
parties); Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 36, at 1476 (opining that Hans was "clear error");
David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) ("[T]he Court in Hans veered far from the course .... ");
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1978) (noting that recent scholarship suggests
that the Eleventh Amendment was not meant to completely preclude suits in federal court
against the states by private individuals); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1262-64 (1989)
(defending the diversity theory, which interprets the Eleventh Amendment as not closing
off other sources of federal jurisdiction); Lawrence Marshall, Fighting the Words of the
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 passim (1989) (noting that the text of the
Eleventh Amendment clearly does not preclude all suits against a state); David L. Shapiro,
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984) (suggesting that Hans was "an
unforced error.").
172. Shapiro, supra note 171, at 71.
173. The legal role that "erroneous" judicial decisions or other governmental acts
(including the passage of statutes) can play within a legal system is meticulously explored
in the Fehlerkalkiil (calculus of error) of Adolf Merkl. ADOLF MERKL, DIE LEHRE VON
DER RECHTSKRAFT ENTWICKELT AUS OEM RECHTSBEGRIFF 293 (1923). Kelsen
followed Merkl in this regard. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 16, at 70-89; PURE
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Conversely courts would be forbidden to make law by
interpreting law if anything but a single interpretation of a law was
ignored by officials within the system as void. This is probably true,
for example, of Article VII. Article VII does not authorize the courts
to authorize (retroactively) the conventions of the original thirteen
states to enact the Constitution. The reason is that, if a court were to
declare the Constitution invalid because of its interpretation of
Article VII, its decision would simply be ignored by the community of
officials even if the court's decision were not invalidated through legal
channels. The court would not be accepted as having lawmaking
power in that area.
This official resistance to deviant judicial interpretations does not
have to mean that the legal justification of the Constitution is official
acceptance, rather than Article VII, or that the Constitution has no
legal justification as law at all-that is, that it is simply part of the
axiom of our legal system. 174 For it may still be true that officials,
when asked why the Constitution is valid, would appeal to Article
V.II-not claim that its status as law is in need of no justification or
that official acceptance is the justification. All their resistance might
mean is that they do not defer to courts' interpretation of Article VII.
Article VII would authorize the conventions of the original thirteen
states directly, rather than authorizing the courts to authorize these
conventions. See Figure P.

THEORY, supra note 16, at 236-56, 267-78. For a discussion of Kelsen's views, see
generally EBENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 127-32; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250-91 (2003); Stanley L. Paulson, Kelsen on Legal
Interpretation, 10 LEGAL STUD.: J. SOC'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 136 (1990); Stanley L. Paulson,
Material and Formal Authorization in Kelsen's Pure Theory, 39 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172
(1980); Stanley L. Paulson, Subsumption, Derogation, and Noncontradiction in "Legal
Science," 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 802 (1981).
174. See supra Section II. B.
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Figure P

T

5

Of course, judicial lawmaking of some sort is inevitable in any
system with courts. Courts exist because there is disagreement about
the application of the law. If there were no disagreement-if what
counted as a correct application was as clear as what counts as a
correct move in chess-adjudicators would be no more necessary in a
legal system than they are in games of chess. And without some
deference to courts' decisions, they could not function to resolve
disagreement about the application of the law.
But it does not follow that judicial lawmaking occurs whenever
courts use their own judgment to apply the law. After all, whenever a
court decides a case, it must rely upon its own judgment about
whether the Constitution is valid law. But it has no lawmaking power
in applying, say, Article VII, for it cannot diverge from the common
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understanding of Article VII without its decision being treated as a
legal nullity.
With this in mind, consider a recent argument by Matthew Adler
and Michael Dorf that judicial review concerning whether a law has
satisfied constitutional "existence conditions"-that is, conditions for
something to be a law, rather than a nullity-is inevitable in any legal
system in which courts can issue binding judgments applying the
law. 175 Adler and Dorf's argument appeals to the fact that a court
must exercise its own judgment about whether these existence
conditions are satisfied:
Imagine, for example, a law enacted in conformity with Section
7 of Article I that purports to require a three-fifths majority in
each house for all subsequent measures raising taxes and that
further declares itself amendable only by a three-fifths majority
in each house. Even in the counter-Marbury world, it seems
clear that a federal court would have to engage in
nondeferential constitutional reasoning in order to determine
whether to treat this law as binding in the face of a subsequent
measure-enacted by simple majorities of both houses of
Congress, signed by the President, and thus appearing to be an
authoritative utterance of Congress-purporting to repeal it. 176
According to Adler and Dorf, "judges cannot avoid enforcing those
provisions of the Constitution that identify the procedure for
legislation and perhaps those that demarcate Congress's powers. " 177
But it is also true that Congress cannot defer to a judicial opinion
without determining-without deference-whether it actually satisfies
the existence conditions for a judicial opinion. If Congress were
obligated to defer to anything that claimed to be a judicial opinion
concerning the issue of whether it actually is a judicial opinion, our
legal system would collapse. Any lunatic could announce something
as a judicial opinion and Congress would be obligated to accept it as
such. So it seems that there must be congressional review of judicial
opinions just as much as there must be judicial review of statutes.
Why do people not talk about such congressional review? The
reason is that officials tend to agree to such a high degree about
whether the existence conditions for a judicial opinion have been

175. Matthew D . Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1111-16, 1122-28 (2003).
176. /d. at 1111-12.
177. /d. at 1114.
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satisfied that any deviation by Congress, any attempt to treat a
Supreme Court opinion as not "really" an opinion, would be
immediately perceived as legally void. The fact that Congress must
exercise its own judgment to determine whether something is a
judicial opinion gives it no legal power.
Congress's situation is similar to that of a player in a game of
chess. Each player must exercise her own non-deferential judgment
about whether her opponent has made a correct move in a game. If
she had a duty to accept whatever her opponent claimed was a correct
move, the game would collapse-for her opponent could move his
pieces any way he wanted. But this does not mean that she has
power, within the game, of reviewing her opponent's moves. For the
minute her judgment deviated from the common understanding of
what a correct move is like, her opponent would balk and the game
would come to a halt.
Adler and Dorf ignore the possibility that the same phenomenon
could exist in connection with judicial review of whether a law
satisfies constitutional existence conditions. Although federal courts
would have to exercise their independent judgment about whether
existence conditions are satisfied, this might not generate meaningful
judicial review, because the court would be unable to issue a binding
judgment that deviated from officialdom's common understanding
concerning the existence conditions' scope.

B.

Is the Law What a Court Says It Is?

Nevertheless the fact remains that judicial lawmaking of some
sort must exist in a system with courts. Courts cannot fulfill their role
of resolving disagreement concerning the law unless their judgments
legally bind those who disagree to some extent. And in our legal
system the scope of judicial lawmaking appears so expansive that it is
reasonable to inquire as whether the law that the courts interpret puts
any legal restrictions upon a judge. Since judicial misinterpretations
of the Commerce Clause or Sarbanes-Oxley or section 205.3(b)(l) are
treated as valid, in what sense do the laws play any role within our
legal system at all? Why not simply say that under the axiom of our
legal system the law is whatever the courts say it is? 178 See Figure Q.
178. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 121 (2d ed.
1921) ("Thus far we have seen that the Law is made up of the rules for decision which the
courts lay down; that all such rules are Law; that rules for conduct which the courts do not
apply are not Law; that the fact that the courts apply rules is what makes them Law; that
there is no mysterious entity 'The Law' apart from these rules; and that the judges are
rather the creators than the discovers of the Law."). This position reaches back at least as
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Figure Q

Despite courts' expansive authority to make law by interpreting
law, we do not inhabit a legal system in which courts are sovereign. In
arguing for this conclusion, let me begin with H.L.A. Hart's analogy
of a game (assume it is baseball) in which umpires' misapplications of
the rules are nevertheless binding on the players:
(T]he scorer's determinations ... are unchallengeable. In this
sense it is true that for the purposes of the game "the score is
what the scorer says it is." But it is important to see that the
scoring rule remains ... and it is the scorer's duty to apply it as
best he can. "The score is what the scorer says it is" would be
false if it meant that there was no rule for scoring save what the
far as Bishop Hoadley, who argued in 1717 that "[w]hoever hath an absolute Authority to
interpret any written or spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and
Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them." Bishop Benjamin Hoadly,
Sermon Preached Before King George I, at 12 (Mar. 31, 1717) (emphasis in original).
Hoadly's argument is commonly attributed to the legal realists. See, e.g., DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 20-21 (1988) (summarizing legal
realism); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997) (identifying Chief Justice Hughes'
statement that "the Constitution is what the [Supreme Court] say[s] it is" as an element of
legal realism); Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except To Eastern
Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 569-70 (2003)
("Finally, I believe that emphasizing Marbury reinforces the single most pernicious aspect
of American legal education, which is to instill in hapless students the most vulgar of all
notions of Legal Realism, summarized in Charles Evans Hughes' identification of 'the
Constitution' with what the 'judges say it is.' "(citations omitted)); Kenneth Ward, The
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist Perspectives of Law, 18 J.L. & POL. 851,
855, 870 (2002) (associating legal realism with the view that "law is what judges say it is.").
For two classic statements of the realist position, see KARL LLEWELLYN,
BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930) ("What officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law
itself."); Holmes, supra note 58, at 461 ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,
and nothing pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
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[official] scorer in his discretion chose to apply. There might
indeed be a game with such a rule, and some amusement might
be found in playing it if the scorer's discretion were exercised
with some regularity; but it would be a different game. We may
call such a game the game of "scorer's discretion." 179
The difference between baseball and scorer's discretion is that
baseball players make independent judgments about how the game is
proceeding. They often conclude that the umpire is mistaken and
criticize him for violating the rules of the game (even though they
accept his decisions as binding). If they were playing the game of
scorer's discretion, such criticism would make no sense. The very
point of scorer's discretion is to do whatever the scorer says-there is
no ground, from within the rules of the game, for criticizing what the
scorer says.
Hart's argument, as it stands, is not persuasive however.
Granted, in baseball umpires are criticized for making "wrong"
decisions. But this is not enough to conclude that the umpire has a
duty under the rules of baseball to decide correctly. After all, an
umpire would probably be criticized for imitating a monkey after
every pitch, but we would not want to conclude that he therefore has
a duty under the rules of baseball not to imitate monkeys. He would
only be violating a duty within what we can call the "culture" of
baseball. It is not a duty generated by the rules of the game. The
reason is that imitating a monkey has no effect within the game. It
does not, for example, invalidate the umpire's rulings or make
sanctions against the umpire appropriate.
Hart has not explained why baseball is not a game of scorer's
discretion, with duties outside the rules of the game that require the
umpire to rule correctly. The only reason to conclude that an
umpire's error is a violation of the rules of the game is that
identifiable instructions for the game speak of what would be a
correct ruling and there are no identifiable instructions that tell
umpires not to imitate monkeys. For example, we are told that a
"strike" includes a pitch "which ... is not struck at, if any part of the
ball passes through any part of the strike zone. " 180 That is a reason to
think that an umpire who calls a pitch a strike even when it is outside
of the strike zone has violated the rules, not merely the culture of the
179. HART, supra note 59, at 142.
180. Official Rules of Major League Baseball 2.00 (2004), at http://www.mlb.com/
NASApp/mlb/mlb/official_info/official_rules/definition_terms_2.jsp (last visited Dec. 13,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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game.
But that simply returns us to our problem. For there is another
rule-giving the umpire's rulings finality 181-according to which the
earlier rules have no effect within the game. Even if a pitch that is not
struck at is outside the strike zone, it is nevertheless treated as a strike
in the game if the umpire rules it is a strike. The rules defining a
strike have no more effect within the game than the prohibition of
monkey imitations. That seems to push the rules defining a strike out
of the game and into the mere culture of baseball.
I believe Hart's example of scorer's discretion is better
understood as a challenge to the idea that the umpire's rulings are in
fact always authoritative. Assume that an umpire rules a batter out
even though no pitch has yet been thrown. Unlike a less egregious
error, this ruling would very likely be treated as invalid within the
game, in very much the same way that a deranged fan who ran on the
field and started making rulings would find his rulings treated as
invalid. Furthermore, when the players came to the conclusion the
umpire's ruling was invalid, they would be relying upon the
instructions defining a strike.
In short, we can find a role for the instructions defining a strike
within the game of baseball, although it is not the role that they
appear to have. These instructions set up a broad (albeit vague)
standard of reasonableness beyond which the umpire's rulings will be
void. For this reason, a pitch is not always a strike if the umpire says
it is a strike. On the other hand, a reasonable but erroneous ruling is
valid in the game (although it may be a violation of the culture of
baseball).
This is an important difference between baseball and the game of
scorer's discretion. In scorer's discretion, any ruling by the umpire is
valid. Players who objected to the umpire's ruling could not be
objecting on the ground that the umpire violated the rules of the
game. They could only be appealing to duties that the umpire had
outside the game.
The same points can be made with respect to legal systems. One
can imagine circumstances where a judgment that radically misapplies
the law would be treated as a nullity within the legal system. For
example, if a judge ruled that the author of a materially misleading

181. Id. at 9.02(a) ("Any umpire's decision which involves judgment, such as, but not
limited to, whether a batted ball is fair or foul, whether a pitch is a strike or a ball, or
whether a runner is safe or out, is final. No player, manager, coach or substitute shall
object to any such judgment decisions.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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SEC filing should be summarily executed or should be liable to the
judge herself for the sum of $10,000,000, she would find her decision
treated as void, in much the same way that a delusional citizen who
jumped into the judge's seat would find his decisions treated as void.
It would not have to be nullified-for example, on appeal or through
It would instead be a nullity ab initio.
legislative action.
Furthermore, in not following it, officials would not think that they
were revolutionaries.
To the contrary, they would think of
themselves as maintaining the continuity of the legal order. What
would have been revolutionary is if they had followed the court's
decision.
C.

Bush v. Gore

We have concluded that courts have genuine, but limited,
authority to make law through their interpretations (and
misinterpretations) of law. The belief that courts have no authority to
make law in this fashion or that their authority does not go beyond
choosing from a small set of highly plausible interpretations is our
sixth mistake concerning legal revolutions. Because this confusion
treats the courts' powers to make law as more restrictive than they
really are, it makes perfectly legal events look like revolutions.
Assume that a court acted outside its authority every time its
interpretation deviated from what is most plausible. If a deviant
decision were nevertheless accepted as valid, there would have been a
shift in the chains of legal validity. Valid law could no longer be
traced back to the sovereign in the system. Although the court was a
mere subsidiary lawmaker within the system, it would now be
supreme.
This is the way Bush v. Gore 182 has been characterized by some of
its critics. As Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson put it, the decision
was a "judicial coup" 183- " [ a] colossal act of illegality that subverts
182. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
183. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 12, at 1108; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at
200 (contesting "the five's revolutionary doctrines"); Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 235
(describing the Supreme Court's decision as "lawless"); Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore
and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 7, 28 (Summer 2002) ("One powerful consequence of Bush v. Gore, then, is that it
further entrenches the monarch-like status of the United States Supreme Court as
'ultimate constitutional interpreter,' with a monarch-like royal prerogative to ignore
ordinary legal restraints when necessary to protect the public good."). For a skeptical
account of such claims with respect to other Supreme Court decisions, see Fried, supra
note 139, at 33 (arguing that even in radical decisions, "the Court's exercise of power
claimed to be interpretive, not revolutionary, and was accepted as such").
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constitutional structures." 184 The Supreme Court acted outside its
authority in Bush v. Gore. Due to acquiescence in the decision by
officials and the American people, however, it is now being treated as
legal. This means that there has been a shift in legal systems (albeit a
subtle one). The members of the Supreme Court "appear to have
gotten away with it," 185 just as President Mirza got away with shifting
supreme authority in Pakistan from the constitution (or its ratifiers)
to himself. And like President Mirza's, the Supreme Court's coup
was the "cumulative result of successful partisan entrenchment"
within the institutions of the old system. 186
So understood, Balkin and Levinson's criticisms distort the
structure of the legal system they claim to defend. Bush v. Gore is not
a legal nullity that gained its validity only through extra-legal changes
in legal practice. For that would mean that had this extra-legal shift
not occurred-had we remained in the same legal system-the
decision would have been ignored by other legal actors as unworthy
of a legal response. But we all know that the true revolution would
have been if the Court's decision had been ignored, if everyone else
had simply acted as if it had not really decided the case at all.
Balkin and Levinson characterize public and official
acquiescence in the decision as the type of passivity that allows coups
to succeed:
[T]he message from many quarters these days is that we should
forget about it: The Supreme Court has spoken, Bush won the
election, he is in the White House, and one should get over it.
Let's move on. We do not doubt the emotional conflict that
many Americans now face. It is hard to admit that one lives in
a country that has just suffered through a judicial coup. And
many people will do almost anything to avoid recognizing that
very unsettling fact. 187
In fact, this acquiescence is precisely why the decision was legally
valid. This was not a new form of acquiescence that shifted
sovereignty. It was precisely the same (limited) acquiescence to
judicial decisions that has always existed and that keeps us within the
American legal system. 188
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
Court's

Balkin & Levinson, supra note 12, at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1068.
ld. at 1107-08 (citations omitted).
My argument is, of course, the furthest thing from a justification of the Supreme
opinion, in the sense in which opinions are justified in law reviews. It is instead an
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Although much of what Balkin and Levinson say-especially
their use of the phrase "judicial coup"-suggests the interpretation I
have offered above, Professor Balkin has privately argued that their
position is "that the Court acted in violation of the law, but [not] that
we have shifted [legal] regimes as a result." 189 The Court's decision is
simply an illegality within an abiding legal system:
We shouldn't confuse illegality in a particular case with
revolution and the creation of a new legal regime. It is
perfectly possible for a government official to break the law,
even egregiously, have nobody complain about it or acquiesce
in what they have done, and not create a revolution or a shift in
legal regime. It happens all the time. Think about police
brutality. Or torture. These actions don't change the legal
regime. They are illegal within the existing legal regime. In
particular courts can act illegally, and people can acquiesce in
their decisions, and life goes on. But it isn't a revolution. It's
like getting beaten up by a crooked cop. 190
The analogy with police brutality is inapt however. Police brutality
may remain unremedied, but it is not actually considered by the
population (and particularly by the officials who participate in the
rule of recognition) to be legal. In contrast, Bush v. Gore is treated as
the law. Indeed, if officials were to view police brutality as legally
permissible, it would be fair to say that a revolution had occurred.
What Balkin and Levinson need is an account of official
acceptance of the decision as law that does not amount to a
revolutionary change in the standards of legal legitimacy. Balkin has
suggested this possibility:
[I]t is very important to distinguish acceptance of an act as legal
from acceptance of the legality of the consequences that flow
from that act. . . . People often believe that consequences will
be legal even if the original act was illegal. . . . Why? Because
people like stability and the benefits of procedural regularity
going forward into the future. In order to achieve these goods,
. . . some degree of illegality will be accepted in the system
(sometimes grudgingly) if there is nothing one can do about it,
observation about the remarkably broad scope of the Supreme Court's lawmaking powers
within our legal system. For a justification of the opinion, see, for example, Nelson Lund,
The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002).
189. E-mail from Jack Balkin (June 16, 2004, 04:14 EST) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
190. /d.
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and the consequences that flow from that original illegality will
be accepted too .... 191
But what is the difference between the acquiescence in illegality
in the interest of stability that fails to change the legal system and the
very same acquiescence that leads to a revolution? After all, it was
undoubtedly true that officials in Pakistan acquiesced in President
Mirza's coup because they liked "stability and the benefits of
procedural regularity going forward into the future. " 192 So why not
say that there was no coup in Pakistan in 1958-and that Mirza's acts
were simply illegalities whose consequences were accepted within the
old legal system in which the Constituent Assembly was sovereign?
Balkin might argue that the difference is that Bush v. Gore was
not as radical an illegality as Mirza's coup. Officials in our legal
system have acquiesced in illegalities similar to Bush v. Gore in the
past. But if this is true, then why not simply say that the Supreme
Court is authorized under the rule of recognition to make law through
its interpretations-and misinterpretations-of law? Why call Bush
v. Gore "illegal" when its consequences and the consequences of
similar decisions by the Supreme Court are habitually treated by
officials as legal? What does this alleged illegality mean, when it
makes no difference within.our legal system?
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have argued that attending to the structure of
legal systems can reveal mistakes that arise when legal revolutions are
discussed. Since these mistakes reveal themselves as mistakes only in
the light of this structure, however, what reason do we have to believe
that the law actually abides by this structure in the first place?
It would be one thing if I could point to the structure
constraining, in some way, the extra-legal facts. But I admitted that
the structure of legal systems is ultimately extra-legally explained.
We only know what the axiom of a legal system is through extra-legal
evidence. But if that is true, what could possibly be added by talking
about the structure over and above the extra-legal through which it is
explained? Why not simply talk about the law as seen from that
extra-legal perspective, for example in terms of certain patterns of
acceptance by officials?

191. E-mail from Jack Balkin (June 18, 2004 12:37 EST) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
192. /d.
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This is indeed a serious challenge to the approach of this
Article-one that I believe was raised by the American legal
realists. 193 The realist, as I understand him, bites the bullet and denies
that there is any significance to talk of "valid" law. The only
appropriate perspective on the law is extra-legal, and "law" exists
only to the extent that it can be described in extra-legal terms-that
is, in terms of conventions, attitudes and relationships of power and
influence.
Something important is lost when the realist's approach is
adopted, however.
Consider the following analogy from the
philosophy of logic. Even logicists admit that people accept the
foundational axioms of logic-such as the law of non-contradictionfor extra-logical reasons. 194 The causes of our agreement about these
axioms are physiological, psychological and sociological-for
example, the constitution of our brains, certain innate habits or
instincts, and socialization by parents and teachers. 195 If logical
reasoning can be explained extra-logically, why not give up on logical
structure entirely and simply speak in physiological, psychological
and sociological terms?
The problem is that once we adopt the extra-logical perspective,
logical continuity and discontinuity vanish. Assume that, starting
with the premise "all whales are mammals," someone concludes "all
whales are mammals and are not mammals." From the extra-logical
perspective, this inference is contrary to the way that physiology,
psychology and sociology tell us people normally behave. But it is
not discontinuous. The extra-logical perspective cannot make sense
of the revolutionary nature of the inference-the impossibility of
getting to the conclusion from the premises within the structure of our
logical system.
By analogy, the legal realist may be right, but if she is, legal
revolutions are impossible. To the extent that the law is simply
constituted by certain patterns of behavior, the movement from one
set of patterns to another, whether it is gradual or sudden, has none
of the discontinuity and incommensurability that we associate with
revolutions.
Granted, the realist has no reason to deny the
occurrence of the sociological changes associated with revolutions.
But seen from his purely extra-legal perspective, these changes are
not discontinuous.
193. See supra Section II.A.
194. See supra Section II.A.
195. See supra Section II.A.
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Consider the differing responses of a realist and someone
committed to my approach as the events in late eighteenth century
North America unfolded. For the latter, one set of valid laws-a set
justified by the authority of the British King-in-Parliament-is
replaced by an incommensurable set of valid laws justified by a
different authority. She cannot legally reason from the first set to the
second, because the revolution involves a shift in the axioms on the
basis of which such reasoning is undertaken. For the realist, in
contrast, there is no such shift in axioms, because he has abandoned
the activity of reasoning about "the law" in favor of extra-legally
determining how relationships of power and influence can be
navigated. When these relationships change, the realist, of course,
changes his behavior to accommodate them, but the principles by
means of which he extra-legally reasons remains the same.
My argument, therefore, is not that the structure of legal systems
must apply, but that it applies to the extent that one believes in the
possibility of revolutions. One can look at the law as the realist does,
but the price one pays is that legal discontinuity and continuity
vanish. The fact that we believe revolutions are possible shows our
commitment to the structure.
The same answer applies to a more limited criticism. One can
admit that legal systems have a structure but argue that the structure
is often indeterminate, in the sense that it will be unclear whether an
act is inside or outside the authority of a lawmaker. But, once again, I
am not arguing that the structure must be fully determinate-only
that it is precisely as determinate as our belief in the possibility of
revolution.
Consider the case of Harris v. Minister of the Interior. 196 The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa struck
down a statute passed by the South African Parliament that
disenfranchised certain "non-European"-that is, mixed-racevoters.197 The Appellate Division's reason was that, under a clause in
the South Africa Act, a statute with subject matter of this sort had to
be passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses sitting in joint
session. 198 The statute had not satisfied these requirements, since it
was passed by simple majorities of the separate houses of

196. 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A). The case is discussed in HART, supra note 59, at 122. See
also Erwin N. Griswold, The "Coloured Vote Case" in South Africa, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1361 (1952) (discussing Harris, soon after the decision was announced).
197. See Harris, 1952 (2) S.A. at 449-50,472.
198. /d.
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Parliament. 199 The Parliament's response was to enact, by simple
majorities of the separate houses, the High Court of Parliament Act,
which created an appellate body for review of decisions by the
Appellate Division that struck down Parliamentary statutes.Z00 The
new High Court dutifully overturned the Appellate Division's
decision. 201 The Appellate Division, in turn, struck down the High
Court of Parliament Act. 202
Eventually the Parliament changed tactics, deciding instead to
pack the Appellate Division. 203 Once packed, the Court reversed
itself. 204 But what if the Parliament had not changed tactics? Whose
word would be law-the Parliament (through its High Court) or the
Appellate Division?
The structure of legal systems does not demand an answer to this
question.
All it demands is that, if there is no answer, no
revolutionary break in legal continuity will occur no matter whose
word gets treated as law. Furthermore, this lacuna does not mean
that structural concerns have no role in understanding the legal
system in other respects. We can still say that a revolution would
have occurred, for example, had a court of the General Division,
which are trial courts in the South Africa legal system, defied the
Appellate Division and this defiance came to be accepted as legal.
Our belief in the structure of legal systems is as strong (and as
weak) as our belief in the possibility of discontinuity in the legal
order. The law may be completely unstructured. But those
interested in legal discontinuity must disagree, and so ignore this
structure at their peril.

199. /d. at 449.
200. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Demise of the High Court of Parliament in South
Africa, 66 HARV. L. REV. 864, 865 (1953).
201. !d. at 866 n.9.
202. Minister of the Interior v. Harris, 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (A). See also Griswold, supra
note 200, at 866 (discussing procedural history of the case).
203. Charles Villa-Vicencio, Whither South Africa? Constitutionalism and Lawmaking, 40 EMORY L.J. 141, 152 (1991).
204. Collins v. Minister of the Interior, 1957 (1) S.A. 552, 566 (A). See also VillaVicencio, supra note 203, at 152.
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